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Private Problem, Public Solution:
Affirmative Action in the 21st Century
by
Darlene C. Goring•

[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is strict in theory,
but fatal in fact. . . . The unhappy persi stence of both the practice
and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority
groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is
not disqual i fied from acting in response t o it.1

I. INTRODUCTION
At some point during the ninety-nine years between the United States

Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson

2

and its decis i on in Adarand

Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 3 the concepts o f race, color and ethnicity were
eradicated as constitutionally relevant factors in the Equal Protection paradigm, or
so the argument goes . 4 Clearly, immutable characteristics such as race, color and

• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law, B.B.A., Howard
University; J .D. and L.L.M ., Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank
Leonard S. Rubinowitz for his continued support and encouragement. I would also like to
thank Mark T. Hurst and Carol Parris for their valuable research assistance.
1

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,

4

See generally Sean M. Scott, Justice Redefined: Minority-Targeted Scholarships and the

515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)(0'Connor, J.).
2 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3 Adarand Co nstruc to rs Inc., 515 U.S. at 200.
,

Struggle Against Racial Oppression, 62 UMKC L.REv. 651 (1994) . In this article P rofessor

Scott argues that the Supreme Court's color-blind interpretation of the Equal Protection

Clause "perpetuates a concept of racial justice that is defined by the dominant, not the
outside, group and leads to the continued racial oppression of African-Americans." Id. at

668. He similarly argues that a race-neutral constitutional paradigm is both judicially and
socially misleading. He notes that:
The strategy of color blindness is being questioned as is the
assumption that a color-blind society will be the equivalent of a racially
equal and just society. Those professing color-blindness confuse the
recognition of race, and the difference that race makes, with racism.
There is an increased rejection of the concept that to recognize race is the
equivalent of being a racist. This presumption is being stood on its head
by outsiders and whites who have begun to listen to the stories of

209

·
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ethnicity continue to play important roles not only in the American jurisprudential
landscape, but in all facets of American society . Howeve�, th� con�ept o f a � olor
_
_
_
blind society ,5 as first articulated by Justice Harlan m his d1ssentmg opm1on m
Plessy, 6 has become a popular justification for attacking remedial efforts that seek

outsiders; we posit that not to recognize and acknowledge race is to deny
the positive value o f being African-America n or non-white.
Race-consciousness rejects the assimilationist model inherent to
color-blindness and instead argues for acculturation and recognition of the
value of being racially different.

It treats difference respectfully and

recognizes that race plays a critical role in developing perspectives.

It

advocates the telling of outsider narratives by the oppressed group and the
hearing of these stories by the privileged group.

It suggests that our

societal goal should not necessarily be to move beyond race but instead
to come to value the difference that race makes.

Id. at 693-94.
5

For a discussion of the m erits of the color-blind constitution see generally, Nicholas deB.

Katzenbach & Burke Marshall, Not Color Blind: Just Blind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1 998, §

6 (Magazine) at 42.
More recently, however, a majority has edged toward pronouncing the
Constitution "color blind," coming close to holding legislation that uses
any racial classification unconstitutional. Reading the Equal Protection
Clause to protect w hites as well as blacks from racial classification is to
focus upon a situation that does not and never has existed in our society.
Unfortunately, it casts doubt upon all forms of racial classif ication,
however benign and however focused upon promoting integration.

If

such a reading is finally adopted by a majority of the Court, it would put
a constitutional pall over all governmental affirmative action programs
and even put similar private programs in danger of being labeled
"discriminatory" a gainst whites and therefore in violation of existing civil
rights legislation - perhaps the ultimate stupidity.

Id.
But see Marquez Lundin, The Callfor a Color-Blind Law, 30 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS.

407 ( 1 997).

Marquez rejects the use of the strict scrutiny analysis to determine the

constitutional validity of race-based preferences, and i nstead argues that "governmental race
based action should always be impermissible." Id. at 408. He notes that:
A color-blind law will not only heal our racial divide, it is also the surest

protection for the rights of all minority groups. One need look no
further
than Korematsu to see that as long as race can be used at all, it
can b e
used for ill. It i s tragic that the search for racial equality has
turned into
a battle or racial classification and the division of rights and
benefits o n
that baSIS.

�

Id. at 456.
�

See Pless�-, 163 U.S. at 5 59.
But in view of the constitution' in the eye
of the Jaw, there ts m th "1s
·

·
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to eliminate the continuing effects of discrimination on racial and ethnic minority
groups.7
Although the concept of race neutrality is implicit in the Court's
interpretation of a color-blind constitution, it does not mean however, that race or
ethnicity cannot be used as a constitutionally permissible criterion in the allocation
of resources8. On the contrary, it means that if used, race-based classifications must

country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is
here.

no caste

Our c onstitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates

classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal
before the law.

Id.
7 See generally Wooden v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., et, 32 F. Supp.2d 1370 (S.D.
Ga. 1999); Gratz v. Bollinger, et al., 183 F.R.D . 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Gruttcr v.
Bollinger, 16 F. Supp.2d 797 (E.D Mich. 1998); Smith v. University of Washington Law
School, 2F. Supp.2d 1324 (W.D. Wash. 1998); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38F.3d 147 (4th Cir.
1994); Hopwood v. State of Tex., 78F.3d 932

(5th Cir. 1996); DeRondc v. Regents of Univ.

of Cal., 625 P.2d 220 (Cal. 1981); Regents of University of Cal. v. Bak.kc, 438 U.S. 265
(1978); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
Burke Marshall,

Not Color Blind: Just Blind,

at 42:

See also Nicholas deB. Katzenbach &

N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,

1998, § 6 (Magazine)

Affirmative action programs, whether to avoid present bias or to remedy
the effects of three centuries of discrimination against African-Americans,
are race-based. The problems they seek to cure are and have been racc
based.

They stem from history-the political, economic and social

domination

of blacks by a white majority that regarded blacks as inferior.

Undoubtedly there are blacks who are biased against whites and who,
given the power to do so, would discriminate against them. Of course,
given the power, it would be as morally wrong for them to do so as it has
been for whites.

But discrimination by blacks against whites is not

America's problem.

It is not the problem that predominantly white

legislatures, businesses and universities seek to solve through affirmative
action programs.

Id.
8

The modem origin of a color-blind society can be traced to the "I Have a Dream" speech

delivered by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr on August 28, 1963 at the Lincoln Memorial in
Washington, D.C. He stated that "I have a dream that my four little children will one day
live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but the content of
their character." DEBORAH GILLAN STRAUB, AFRICAN AMERICAN VOICES 211 (1996). Dr.
King's words continue to resonate throughout American society, but the color-blind society
envisioned by Dr. King could not have included a nation where the vestiges of racial
discrimination were eliminated without a simultaneous recognition of the impact that racial
discrimination had

on the African American society.

[Vol. 33:2

AKRON LAW REVIEW

212

be able to withstand the strict constitutional scrutiny that is the cornerstone of the
Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause ?f the �ourteenth
_
Amendment.9
This analytical paradigm requires an _m1t1al fmdmg
of a
constitutionally compelling justification for the use of the race-based criterion.
Supreme Court case law is clear - the goal of eliminating discrimination or
remedying the present effects of past discriminatory practices can serve as a
compelling justification for the use of race-based classifications. '0 Proo f of broad
societal discrimination will not withstand constitutional scrutiny. Additionally, the
discriminatory conduct must have been performed by the party implementing the
race-based remedy. Strict scrutiny also mandates that the race-based remedy be
narrowly tailored to address the harm resultant from such past discriminatory
conduct.
Notwithstanding the scope and breadth of conflicting views generated by
this paradigm, the Court has clearly embraced this racially neutral interpretation of
the strict scrutiny test, and incorporated it into the Equal Protection paradigm. The
goal of this Article is not to enter into that debate, but to work within the analytical
parameters currently established by the Court to address unresolved issues. For
example, is the racially neutral interpretation of the strict scrutiny test s o strict that·
most, if not all, race-based criteria will be stricken? If so, is the Court willing to
recognize a broader range of constitutionally permissible justifications for the use
of race-based classifications?11 This Article embraces the Court's color-blind
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause as the standard against which race
based affirmative action preferences will be measured, and proposes strategies
aimed at satisfying this heightened constitutional standard.

9

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ,§ 1.

N� state s?�ll mak� or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
_
or unmumhes of c1t1zens
of the United States; n or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor

10

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Pursuant to Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of University of California v. Bakke

U.S. 265 an unresolved question remains regarding the continued permissib

ility

438

of divdrsity

�1S a compelling justification for the use of race-based .criteria. Id.
See Wygant v. J�ckson B�. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986)
(O'Connor J., conc urring)
And c��amly nothmg the Court has said today necess
arily forecloses the
_
poss1b1
hty that the Court will find other governmental
interests which
have been relied upon in the lower courts but which
have not been passe d
on here to e sufficiently "important" or "comp
elling" to sustain the use
of affirmative action policies.

�

Id.
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The Court's racially neutral interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
has given opponents of race-based preferences significant ammunition in their
efforts to eliminate affirmative action programs. Although the attack on race-based
affirmative action has occurred on many fronts, this Article will foc us on the field
on higher education.12

Recent judicial and legislative attacks on race-based

affirmative action preferences by colleges and universities across the country are
beginning to take their toll. During the past few years, there has been a tremendous
decrease in the number of racial and ethnic minority students enrolling in and
successfully completing college and professional schools. 13

12

In addition, the

Also note that others have limited their analysis of affirmative action programs to the field

of higher education. See generally, WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE
RIYER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE A ND UNIVERSITY
ADMISSIONS xxv (1998).

This study is limited in several important respects.

First, we are

concerned solely with higher education. In our view, one problem with
much of the debate over affinnative action is that it lumps together a large
number of highly disparate areas and programs, ranging from the
awarding of contracts to minority-owned businesses to policies governing
hiring and promotion to the admissions policies of colleges and
universities. The arguments that pertain to one area may or may not apply
in other areas.

It is noteworthy, for example, that the plaintiffs in the

Piscataway case, which centered on the layoff of a white secondary
school teacher, took pains in their final brief to ask the Supreme Court not
to confuse the job-specific issues that confronted the plaintiff with the
much broader, and rather different, sets of considerations that face
educational institutions in deciding whom to admit.

Id.
13

See generally, The Declining Enrollments of Blacks in Schools of Architecture, 23 J.

BLACKS HIGHER ED. 35 (1999);AdamCohen/lrvine, "When the Field is Level in California,

Minority Students are "Cascading out of Top Schools and into the Second Tier. Is This
Good For Them?", TIME, July 5, 1999, at 30; Nancy Cantor, Affirmative Action: What
Michigan can really learn from California, Opinion, Det. News, May 17, 1999, at AJO;
Black Enrollments Drop at Harvard Law School, 23 J. BLACKS HIGHER ED. 135 (1999);
Minority Entrants to California Med Schools Down 32 Percent, MED. & HEALTH, Apr. 26,
1999, available in 1999 WL 10391837; Kenneth R. Weiss, Minority Admissions at UC

Almost at 1997 Level Education: Sharp Drop had followed end of affirmative action last
year. Top campuses have notfally rebounded, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1999, at Al; Kenneth
R. Weiss, UC Board Expected to Ok Davis Plan to Admit Top 4% Education: Another 3,600

students a year would be eligible to attend.

Davis has said minority enrollment would

increase, but officials say impact would be minimal, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1999 at A l ;
Karen Brown, Students protest UMass shift on admissions, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 4, 1999,
atB2; Mary Ann Roser, College Admission law has mixed results, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Dec. 28, 1998, at A 1; Jayne Noble Subler, Minority enrollment increases at Texas
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challenge to race-based affirmative action programs is being systematically

�

in erest groups who are
.
underwriting legal ef forts to eliminate race-based affirmative action prog rams from
spearheaded by well-funded,

conservative public

the landscape of the American college and university system.14 In response to these
well organized legal and political challenges to affirmative action, this Article
attempts to re-introduce an important player into the equation - the federal
government. In an area as vital to the political and social advancement of racial and
ethnic minorities as education, we must shift our emphasis from fighting indi vi dual
battles to preserve these programs, and instead look to Congress for remedial
measures that seek to eradicate a problem that is of national importance.15

universities But schools still show diversity disparities, state report says, DALLAS MORNING

NEWS, Oct. 23, 1998, at lA; Linda Wertheimer & Clau d io Sanchez,

The growth in the

number of blacks, Latinos and other minorities at U.S. colleges and universities has been
declining for nearly a decade.

A new report released today says that lower academic

achievement and graduation rates from high school are partly responsible. The study a lso
concludes that the roll back in Affirmative Action in some states is having a chilling effect
across the nation, ALLTHINGS CONSIDERED, Sept. 24, 1998, available in 1998 WL 3646569;

Kenneth Weiss, Fewer Blacks and Latinos Enroll at UC Education: Declines are sharpest
at top campuses, while numbers increase at Irvine, Riverside and Santa Cruz, L.A. TIMES,
May 21, 1998, at A3.
14 At the f orefront of the battle challenging race-based affinnative action programs is The
Center for Individual Rights ("CIR"). CIR is a non-for p rofit public interest law firm that
-

draws support from a number of attorneys who work for CIR on a pro bono basis. The
mission of this law firm is to defend "individual rights, with particular emphasis on civil
rights, freedom of speech, the free exercise of religion, and sexual harassment law. CIR
provides free legal representation to deserving clients who cannot otherwise obtain or afford
legal counsel and whose individual rights are threatened." CIR (last modified Sept . 9, 1999)
<http://www.cir-usa.org/rnission.htm>.

For a c ritical evaluation of the goals of this organization , see Theodore Cross, A frican
American Opportunities in Higher Education: What Are the Racial Goals for The Center

for Individual Rights?, 23 J. BLACKS HIGHER ED. 94 (1999).
15. See Dr. A 'lclia Robinson He
�, Perpe uating Inequality: Plessy v. Ferguson and the
Dilemma of Black Access to Pu blic and Higher Education, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 47 (1998).

�

In the time since the Brown decision called upon the states to dismantle
their segregationist systems of public and h i gher education, the
educational gains of African Americans have been nothing short of
monumental. In 1994, African Americans received more undergraduate
and graduate degrees than at any time history, and most of these
individuals were the prod�cts of TWis. The 1Wis are now the major
producers of black professionals and doctorates. In 1994, approximate!
834,000 African Americans were enrolled in 4-year undergraduat

�

institutions, and 615,000 in community colleges. 111,000 African
Americans were enrolled in graduate school, which represented a 66

2000)
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This Artic l e will expl ore the origins of the Court's color-blind interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the role that this interpretation plays in the
development of new barriers against chall enges to race-based affirmative action
programs. Part

II o f this Arti cle traces the development and application of the strict

scrutiny test to e v a l u ate the constitutionality of both invidious and benign racial
classifications . Part III examines Justice Powell's position that racial classifications
used as remedial measures may overcome the presumption o f constitutional
invalidity associated with the use of race-based classifications . In this context, the
Court recognizes that the continued impact o f past and present discriminatory
practices serves a s a barrier to the abil ity o f racial and ethnic minorities to equally
participate in the American social, political, and economic proces s .
Part IV o f thi s Article focuses on whether the strict scrutiny test may be
satisfied by imp l ementation of Congressional l y mandated race-based remedial
programs.

By d i s tingu i s hing the appl ication of the strict scrutiny test used to

evaluate municipal and state remedial efforts from the more deferential standard
used to evaluate Congressionally mandated programs, I argue that §516 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, in concert with the enforcement powers set forth in Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter referred to as Title

VI), 17 authorizes

Congress to determine whether discrimination or the effects of past discrimination
continue to influence the racial and ethnic compo s iti on of educational institutions
within the field of higher education. If convincing proof of discrimination is found,
Congress may impl e ment remedial race-based programs to increase the number of
racial and ethnic minority group members within both public

and private

educational institutions that receive federal funding.

percent increase over the previous dec ade. Over this same period, the
number of black s in professional sc hool r ose from I 3,000 to 22,000. In
the year s between years of 1985 and 1993, the number of African
Americans who r ec eived the bachelor 's degrees incr eased by 8 p erc ent,
and those who received the master 's degree by 42 percent. In 1995, the
number of doctoral degrees aw arded to Afric an Amer icans reach ed an
all-time high, ri sing 17 percent over the previous year, from 1 095 to
1 ,287.
Id. at 62-63.
16
U.S. CONST. am end. XIV, § 5. ("The Congress shall have p ower t o enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the pr ovisions of this article.")
17 Ti tl e VI of the Civil Right s Act of 1964 provi des that "[n]o person in the United St ates
shall, on the ground of race, c olor, or national origin, be excluded from p articipation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financ ial assist anc e." 42 U.S.C§ 2000d (1964).
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II. THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRICT SCRUTINY TEST

The guarantees o f the Equal Protection Clause18 serve as the foundation
u p on which the Court e v aluates the role that racial classifications play in the
allocation of societal rights and privil ege s. 19 Thi s Clause provides, in pertinent part,
that

"

[n] o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws."20 To effectuate the protections afforded by the rourteenth
Amendment, the use o f race-based classifications,

although

not

expressly

prohibited, "must be analyzed b y a re viewi n g c ourt under strict scrutiny."21 Th is
heightened level of scrutiny did not always e x i s t .

Alth o ugh the language of t he

Fourteenth Amendment represented a sig n i fi c ant evolution in the legal p r o te ction
afforded initially to African Americans,22 the Supreme Court's initial interpretation

18

The Supreme Court does not look upon race-based clas sifications with favor. See Shaw

v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 6 43 (1993 )("[c]lassifications of citizens solely on the b as i s or race
are by their very nature odious to a free people who s e institutions arc founded upon the
doctrine of equality.")
19

See also Nicholas deB. Katzenbach & Burke Marshall, Not Color Blind: Just Blind, N.Y.

TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998,

§ 6 (Magazine) at 42.

If problems of race are to be solved, they m u s t be seen as the race-based
problems they are . It is this aspect of the controversy that recent decision s
of the Supreme Court have brought into q ue s tion. The Equal Protection
Clause of the 14lh Amendment was designed to insure that former slaves
and their descendants were entitled to the same legal protection as white
Like the 13th Amendment abo l i s hing slavery and the 15th

citizens.

guaranteeing the right to vote regardless o f race, it was clearly a n d
unequivocally aimed at racial problems- i n t oday's terminology "race
based."

The Equal Protection Clause has

never been viewed a s

preventing classification of citizens for governmental reasons as long a s

Id.

20
21

the legislative classification was "reasonable" in terms o f its purpose.

U . S . CONST. amend. XIV.

Adarand Constructors, Inc . v . Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Reliance on a strict
constitutional evaluation of racial classifications originates with language from s uprcmc
· ·
· H"zrabayashi v. U.S., and Korematsu v. U.S.:
Court opimons

m
� �

[I]t s oul be noted, t begin ith, that all legal restrictions which curtail
�
.
the civil nghts of a smgle racial group are immediately suspect.
That i s
not to say that al such restrictions are unco n s titution al. It is to say
that
courts must subject them to the most rigid s c rutiny. Pressing
p
ubl
·
IC
.
.
.
.
necesstty may somettm es JUStlfy the existen c e o f such restrictio .
n
s
,
rac
·
i
a
1
.
antagomsm never can.

':

�

Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1994).

22

Prior to the ratification o f the Fourteenth Ame ndm ent in 186
8, the right s of black

2000]
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of these rights was n o t consistent wi th the Amendment's facial guarantees of equal
protection.
Former Chief Justice Earl Warren c haracteri zed the S upreme Court's early
interp retation of the Fourteenth Amendmen t as flawed and without foresight.23 In
reflecting on the historic role of the Court, he concluded that:
the court's

fundamental

error

was

in denying Congress

a

meaningful role in Fourteenth Amendment enforcement. The
Negro faced a variety of barriers - s ome obvious and some quite
subtle - in his struggle to become a full and equal member of
American society , and the federal c o urts were simply not equipped
to undertake the broad range of programs necessary to tear down
those barriers . Those courts could proc eed only on a case-by-case
basis in their efforts to relate abstract n o tions of equ ality with the
real world of racial prejudice, discrimination and distrust.
judicial conclu s i on in Plessy

v.

The

Ferguson that separation of the

races satisfied the constitutional command of equality dramatically
illustrated that abstractjudicial concepts will not necessarily reflect
the real world.24

Americans, although freed from slavery by the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, were
severely limited. For example, '"[l]iberty' in the Fourteenth Amendment, for which the
States were to ensure equal protection was, for Black Americans, primarily a freedom from
slavery and all the common incidents of slavery.

Slaves had been denied freedom of

movement and now, with the Equal Protection Clause, this aspect of liberty was to be
accorded to Black Americans everywhere in the land."

CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE

INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 254 (1997). See also JAMES E.

BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM (1997); JOSEPH B . JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1984 ).

23 EARL WARREN, Fourteenth Amendment: Retrospect and Prospect, in THE FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT: CEN TENNIAL VOLUME 212 (Bernard Schwartz, ed., 1970). See also A. LEON
HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., S H ADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE
AMERICANLEGALPROCESS I I 8 (1996)("Although the Court's erroneous construction of the
Fourteenth Amendment prevailed for over a half-century, the overwhelming consensus today
is that Plessy was an untenable statement of the law that set in motion an era o f oppression
from which our nation still has not fully recovered.")
24

EARL WARREN, Fourteenth Amendment: Retrospect and Prospect, in THE FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT: CENTENNIAL VOLUME 212, 225 (Bernard Sch wartz, ed., 1970)
The remarkable feature of the Supreme Court's Fourteenth Amendment
decisions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is that they
failed to grasp the importance of the nation's commitment to equality and
the increasingly desperate plight of the Negro. Perhaps this failing is

[Vol. 33:2
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Characterizing the Plessy decision as a judicial example of "fundamental
error" does not do justice to the six decades of oppressive constitutional

�

In Plessy26 the Court refused to inval d te s ate
.
legislation that required separate accommodations based on racial
d1stmct10n.

jurisprudence that it spawned.25

Specifically, the Court upheld a Louisiana statute, passed in

�

�

1890, which provided

for "separate railway carriages for the white and colored races."27 The mere fact

particularly apparent to us at this period in history when racial problems
seem to dominate our national life.

Id. at 224-225.
25 A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Life of the Law:
Craftsmanship, 100 HARV. L.REY. 795 (1987).

Values,

Commitment, and

The Supreme Court in Plessy placed its imprimatur on state-imposed
racial segregation and left t o the "large discretion ... of the legislature"
the determination whether the state would separate and treat black people
differently than it did any other group-- majority or minority--in American
society. In the context of the times, the Court's reference to the
"established usages, customs and traditions of the people" was nothing
less than a mandate for states to revert to the past biases, prejudices, and
d iscrimination that had provided the rationale for slavery and America's
earlier legitimization of racism--thc very racism that was the target of the
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments. The majority's thinly
veiled reversion to a slavery-type jurisprudence, despite its invocation of
the fourteenth amendment, was revealed by its frequent citations to and
reliance upon many cases that predated the enactment of the fourteenth
amendment.
Although many lower courts had explicitly endorsed "Jim Crow
segregation" prior to Plessy, the significance of the Supreme Court's
affirmation of the doctrine of 'separate but equal' in 1896 cannot be
u nderestimated. The Court's approval was the final and therefore the most
d evastating judicial step in the legitimization of racism under state law.In
numerous subsequent school cases, state and federal courts continued to
approve racial discrimination and segregation; most of those courts or
counsel of record cited or relied upon Plessy as support for expansive
endorsements of racial subjugation.
Id. at 805-7.

26
�7

Plessy v. Ferguson, 1 63 U.S. 537 (1896) overruled by 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

Plessy, 163 U.S.at540. Plcssy argued that:
he was entitled to every right, privilege, and immunity secured to citizens
of the United States of the white race; and that, upon such theory, he took
possession of a vacant scat in a coach where passengers of the white race
were accommodated, and was ordered by the conductor to vacate said
coach, and take a scat in another, assigned to persons of the colored race
and. having refused to comply with such demand, he was forcibly ejected

:

2000]
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that the Court permitted Homer Plessy2 8 to assert a j udicial challenge to this statute
evidenced an evolution in the American legal system's recognition of African
Americans as citizens of the United States, and therefore entitled them to equal
application of the privileges and immunities arising therefrom.29 However, equal
access to the j udicial system did not guarantee equal treatment within its
boundaries.
The court viewed the concept of equality as contemplated by the Fourteenth
Amendment in Plessy as a way to "enforce the absolute equality of the two races
before the law,"30 but not, as Justice Brown noted, "to abolish distinctions based
upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a
commingling of the two races upon terms u nsatisfactory to either."3 1 This ruling
evidenced an important distinction between legal and social equality that continues

with the aid of a police officer, and imprisoned in the parish jail to answer
a charge of having violated the above act.

Id. at 541-42.
2K

Plessy, 163 U.S. at 541. This was not a typical case, but one specifically designed to test

the constitutionality of this statute. See E LLIS COSE, COWR-BLIND (1997)
As a test of Louisiana's Separate Car Act, Homer Adolph Plessy provoked
a prearranged confrontation by sitting in the first-class "white" section of
a train on the East Louisiana Railway.

Plessy's blood was, by his own

reckoning, only one-eighth "African."

And as the Court noted in its

decision, 'the mixture of colored blood was not discernible

in him.

Id. at 17.
29

Prior to Plessy, Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 3 93 , 404 (1856) governed the ability of African

Americans to participate in the American judicial process.

("We think they [African

Americans] are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included,
under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and
pri vilegcs which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.")

See

a

lso BRYAN K . FAIR, NOTES OF A RACIAL CASTE BABY 95 (1997), which discusses the

continuing impact of

the Dred Scott decision.

Professor Fair writes that "Taney's opinion

in Dred Scott was one of the most decisive moments in the nationalization of white
supremacy in America, as his opinion gave judicial sanction to the commodification and
subordination of all b lacks, whether slave or free, to exclude them from the federal courts.
This decision shows that the malign racial attitudes of whites toward blacks changed very
little between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Even today, one sees evidence of
Taney's beliefs. For example, many whites still live away from blacks as if Blacks were
unfit to associate with.

Many whites continue to enroll their children at schools and

universities with virtually no black students or teachers. Many whites refuse to support
black political candidates, especially in statewide or national elections."

30 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
31 Id.

Id. at 95.
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to permeate all facets of American society.32 This dis tinction also served as t�e
framework for the 'separate but equal' doctrine that was upheld by the Court

m

See Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer's Fiftieth Anniversary: "A Time for
Keeping,-A Time for Throwing Away?," 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 77-78, (1998):
In 1896, the Court, in Plessy v. Ferg uson, justified segregation by

32

interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as enforcing civil and political
equality, but not social equality. Faced with legislative and judicial
commands to equalize civil and political rights,

"states seeking to

disenfranchise African-Americans successively experimented with the
grandfather clause, residency and literacy requirements, and 'privatization'
through the white primary, as well as the familiar tactics of racist
intimidation and discriminatory administration of facially neutral
registration statutes." Overt race-based distinctions continued to appear
in the "sphere of so- called social rights" such as "marriage, education,
public transportation, and accommodation." In fact, b eginning in the

1880s and "gathering steam after Plessy v. Ferguson was decided, the

Southern states passed laws that not only authorized exclusion and
segregation of customers on the basis of race, but in fact required such

discriminatory practices." Additionally, from about 1890 until 1970, other
methods of subordinating African-Americans were used including social
pressure, violence, and other wrongful conduct against these citizens.

It was not until 1954 that the Court in Brown v. Board of
Education recognized social equality by striking down the concept of
segregation as inconsistent with educational equality and declaring that
the "separate but equal" doctrine adopted in Plessy had no place in the
field of public education. Yet, it took another thirteen years after Brown
before the Court in Loving v. Virginia definitively "adopted a categorical

presumption against race-based regulation" by declaring that statutes
prohibiting interracial marriages violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress enacted the

Just before the Court decided Loving,

Civil Rights Act of 1964,

which "ban[s]

'discrimination or segregation' in the provision of g o ods and services,
even by private entities, on the basis of 'race, color, religion, or national
origin,' and outlaw{s] discrimination or segregation in employment
because of a person's 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'" This
Act was possible because of the civil rights movement and the persistent

activities of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and his followers from 1954 to

1964, which kept the issue of racial inequality before the eyes of the
American public. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not end

discrimination

or

racism,

it

represented an

"important

statutory

embodiment of the ideal of racial justice" and helped establish a
"framework for the reso lution of issues of race."

Id.
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Plessy.33 Justice Brown noted that:
[l]aws permitting, and even requiring, their separation, in places
where they are liable to be brought i n to contact, do not necessarily
imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been
general l y , if not un iversally, recognized as within the competency
of the state legisl atures in the exerci s e of their police power.34
The only l i mitation, if you will , on the Court's approval of the ' separate but

33

Charles E. Ross, Symposium: The Role of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit in the Civil Rights Movement, Experience is the Life of the Law, 16 MISS. C. L. REV.

347, 350-351 (1996):

With regard to the Fourteenth Amendment argument, the Plessy Court
also rejected Plcssy's claim by first reasoning that, though the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed

to

enforce the "absolute equality of the two

races before the law," the equality mandated was only "political equality"
and did not extend to "social equality." To illustrate the difference, the
Court cited prior precedent holding that a state could not prohibit people
of the "colored race" from sitting on a jury because such a

p rohib ition

"implied a legal inferiority in civil society, which lessened the security of
the right of the colored race, and was a step toward reducing them to a
condition of servility." The Court rejected this implication with regard to
the use of railroad cars by passengers, however, on the basis

that

the

exercise of t h e police power to provide separate but equal railroad cars
was reasonable in that it promoted the public good and was not intended
for the oppression of a particular class. To buttress its "reasonable"
argument, the Court noted that even the Congress of the United States
required separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia.
The Court further reasoned that the state of Louisiana, through
the enforced separation of the two races, was not stamping the colored
race with a "badge of inferiority," but instead, if members of the colored
race felt such a stamp, it was they themselves as opposed to the state of
Louisiana that was imposing the stamp. The Court flatly rejected the
argument that "equal [social] rights cannot be secured to the negro except
by an enforced commingling of the two races." Plessy came to stand for
the proposition that a state could segregate school children according to
race as long as the facilities in question being provided by the state were
provided to both races equally.

Id.
34 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.

("[T]he enforced separation of the races, as applied to the

internal commerce of the state, neither abridges the privileges or immunities
man, deprives him of his property without due process

of

of the colored

law, nor denies him the equal

protection of the laws, within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. ...

"

).
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b e a valid exercise o police
equal ' doctrine was the require ment that in order t o
as are enacted m g � o d
power, it "must be reasonable, and extend only to such laws
nce o r oppress 10n
faith for t h e promotion of the public good, and not for the annoya
equal ' doctrin e
but
of a particul ar class."35 This decisio n and the resultin g ' se p arate
a n d
s o c 1. a I 3 6
a
u p o n
c o u n t r y
t h e
s e t

35

1 63 U.S. at 550.
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument to consist
in the assumption that the e nforced separation of the two races stamps the
colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason
o f anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses
to put that construction on it.
Id. at 55 1 . But see Justice Harlan' s dissenting opinion in which he argued that "[t]he
arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of race, while they are on a public highway, i s
a badge o f servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the
law established by the constitution. It cannot be justified upon any legal grounds." Id. at
Plessy,

562.
36

See C A R L T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF }UST/CE
THURGOOD MARHSALL 7, n. 7 ( 1 993)('"Jim Crow' describes a practice or policy o f
segregation or discrimination against Negroes in public places, public vehicles, employme n t,
schools , etc. The term derives from a song sung by Thomas Rice in a mid- 1 800s Negro
minstrel show."); RALPH E. LUK ER HISTORICAL D ICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 1 33-34 ( 1 997)
Jim Crow. A term which refers to a wide variety of l egal and extralegal
practices of racial discrimination in the United States i n the nineteenth
and first half of the twentieth centuries. The term had its origin in a white
minstrel show popular across the North in the 1 830s . In it, Thomas
Dartmouth "Daddy" Rice, appearing in blackface, danced and sang a
number called "Jump Jim Crow." Later, the white South reacted to
emancipation and the end o f Reconstruction by enactin g laws separating
the races, restricting the franchise of African Americans and confirming
social mores that discriminated against them. These laws and mores were
c alled "Jim Crow." In law, they banned intermarriage, disfranchised
A frican Americans by a variety of provisions and mandated separate
housing, public accommodations, schools, and transportation.
Id. See a/so, HENRY J. ABRAHAM & B A RBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CIVIL
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 332-33 (7lh ed. 1 998)
The Court' s position, as noted earlier . . . , was that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not place under federal protection "the entire domain of
civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the states," and that the
protection offered by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments was
against state action only, not against private action. And in 1 896 the
Court upheld the convenient discriminatory concept of "separate but
equal'· in the case of Plessy \'. Ferguson. To all intents and purposes the
,
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prophetical ly described by Justice

Justice Harlan attacked the maj ority

decision in Plessy

Harlan

as

on several fronts. 38

black was at the mercy of the states-there was no Warren Court to redress
grievance s . Indeed, until World War II the federal government ass umed
at most a highly limited role in the protection of c i vil rights on the state
level.
Before 1 9 1 0 almost 90 percent of A merica' s blacks Ii ved in the
South and the Border . . . . the core of racial discrimination was naturally
found there, on both the public and the pri vate level.

Thus public

authorities at the s tate and local level s, usually under the guise of the
Court-upheld separate but equal concept, enacted measures (sometimes
taking the form o f a constitutional provision) permitting or even req uiring
segregation of buses, streetc ars, taxicabs, railroads . waiting rooms,

comfort stations, drinking fountains, state and local schools, state colleges
and universities, hospitals, jails, cemeteri es, sport facilities, beaches, bath
houses, swimming pools, parks, golf courses, courth ouse cafeterias,
libraries, dwellings, theaters, hotels, restaurants, and other similar
facilities-be these public, quasi-public, or private in nature; and in terracial
marriages were widely proscribed.

Pri vate individuals and groups, on

their own initiative, and not infrequently encouraged by state authori ties,
acted to deny blacks, and often other non-Caucasians as well, access to
social

clubs,

fraternities and sororities,

pri vate schools,

colleges,

universities, churches, cemeteries, funeral parlors, hospitals, hotels,
dwellings, restaurants, movies, bowling alleys, swimming pools, bath
houses . . . . There was nothing particularly s ecretive about either public
or private discrimination; it was simply an accepted way of life-accepted
by many blacks as well as by almost all whites .

Id. at 333.
37

Plessy, 1 63 U.S. at 5 59. Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the
Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REv. 1 5 1 , 1 55 ( 1 996) ("Harlan's opinion also reflected a
deserved confidence in the power of his analysis ; even in 1 896, even writing alone, he
correctly predicted that j udicial fiat could not forever impose a policy that was
fundamentally wrong." citing Harlan, Plessy D i s s ent p . 559 ("[T]he j udgment this day
rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made b y this tribunal
in the Dred Scott case.").

38 Plessy, 1 63 U.S. at 559 ( Harlan, J.) (" [tlhe law regards man as man, and takes no
account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guarantied by the
s upreme law of the land are invol ved. It is therefore to be regretted that this high tribunal,
the final expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has reached the conclusion that it is
competent for a state to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon
the basis of race." ) .
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In addition to predicting continued racial strife,39 he focused on the interplay
between the use of invidious racial classifications a n d the language of the then

I_-Ie

'

�

hirteent ,40
}
Fourteenth,41 and Fifteenth42 Amendments were mtended to remove the race lme

recently ratified constitutional amendments.

argued that the

from our governmental systems."43 Citing the Court' s previous conclusion that race

39

Plessy, 1 63 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
If evils will result from the commingling of the two races upon public
highways established for the benefit of all, they will be infinitely less than
those that will surely come from state legislation regulating the enj oyment
of civil rights upon the basis of race. We boast o f the freedom enj oyed by
our people above all other peoples. But it is di fficult to reconcile that
boast with a state of the law which, practically, puts the brand of servitude
and degradation upon a large class of our fellow citizens,-our equals
before the law.

Id. at 562.
40

U . S . CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 . "Neither slavery nor i nvoluntary servi tude, except as a

puni s hment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the U nited States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
4 1 U . S . CONST. amend. XIV, §

1.

All persons born or n aturalized in the United S tates, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No S tate shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of Jaw; nor deny to any person within i ts j urisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Id.
42 U . S . CONST. amend. XV , § 1 ("The right of citizens o f the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United S tates or by any S tate on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude").

43

Plessy, 1 63 U.S. at 555. See ANDREW KULL, THE COL.DR-BLIND CONSTITUTION ( 1 992).
[S ] talc legislation "conceived in hostility to, and e nacted for the purpose
of humiliating citizens of the United States of a particular race" must be
"hostile to both the spirit and leller of the Constitution of the United
States." This is a better explanation of the illegality of racial segregation
than has yet appeared in any opinion for a majority of the Supreme Court.
It is not, of course, an argument for a color-blind Constituti on. Raciall y

discriminatory legislation may be neither conceived i n hostility to,
nor
enacted for the purpose of humiliating, citizens o f the United States of
a

particular race. Alternativ ely, Jim Crow laws might be rejecte d on
the
ground that they impose an unreasonable classification, without imply
ing
any broader rule of antidiscrimination. Harlan consciously went furthe
r:
he dcvcloocd an argument for a color-blind Consti tution because he was

·
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could not be used to disqualify potential jurors, Justice Harlan articulated a more
expansive reading of these constitutional provisions. In assessing the rights and
immunities afforded to African Americans , h e concluded that "the constitution of
the United States, in its present form, forbid s , so far as civil and political rights are
concerned, discrimination by the general g o vernment or the states against any
citizen because of h i s race. All citizens are equal before the law."44
Justice Harlan' s color-blind interpretation of the constitution is facially
supportive of the struggle of African Americans.

However, the concept of the

'color-blind' constitution has shortcomings t h at modern jurists and constitutional
s c h o l a r

s

h

a v e

s

e

i

z e d

u p o n

. 4 5

unwilling to rely on j udges to distinguish a good racial classification from
a bad one.
Id. at 121 . E ARL WARREN, Fourteenth Amendment: Retrospect and Prospect, in THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: CENTENNIAL VOLUME 2 1 2 (Bernard Schwartz, ed., 1 970).
The work of reconstructing the divided and battlescarred nation after the
Civil War took many fonns. Most relevant for our purposes were the
basis for the nation's commitment to the concept of equality. Within five
years after the guns of the Civil War had been silenced, Congress had
proposed and the country had ratified three amendments which purported
to give the newly freed slaves civil and political equality with all other
Americans. The Thirteenth Amendment told the Negro that slavery could
have no place in this nation and that he could no longer be treated as
chattel, to be bought and sold at the caprice of his white master. The
Fourteenth Amendment conferred national citizenship on the Negro and
told him that he could expect due process and equal protection before the
law. The Fifteenth Amendment gave the Negro the most potent weapon
in the democratic arsenal - the vote - and promised him the he could
participate fully in the American political process. The three amendments
had a common feature - they designated the Congress as the governmental
body that would take action to ensure that the new commitment to equality
would be fulfilled.
Id. at 215.
44 Plessy, 1 63 U.S. at 5 5 6 .
45 See BRYAN K . FAIR, NOTES OF A RACIAL CASTE BABY ( 1 997).
What did Harlan mean by his dissent in Plessy? What was the context for
his insistence that the American Cons ti tu ti on is color blind? Harlan' s
primary concern in Plessy was undoing black caste. He understood the
implicit message behind segregation statutes: that blacks arc inferior, unfit
to associate with whites. Harlan did not pronounce his color blindness
principle in an equal society but, rather, in one in which race was a
benchmark for status. He considered the Louisiana law unconstitutional
because it implied the inferiority of blacks and the superiority of whites.
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However, some commentators have made clahorate arg uments that Harlan
intended that the government never he ahlc to u se race as a criterion in its
decision making, including when the government sought Lo remedy past
discrimination or eliminate current caste.

B u t these arg u m e n t s t ake

Harlan ' s statements out of conte xt and Lum h i s color hl indncss pri nciple
on its head.
opinion i n

Justice Willi am Brennan ohscrved how J u s t i ce Bro wn ' s

Plessy turned the equal protection c l ause agai nst those whom

it was intended to set free, condemning them to a

"

s eparate

h u t eq ual"

status be fore the law, a status al ways separate hut sel dom equ al. /\nd now
some people want to recast Harlan's dissent

ax a i11s t blacks. condemning

them to racial caste.

Id. at 102; Lackland H . Bloom, Jr., Hopwood, Bakke and thl' Future of tlze Di1·enity
Justification, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. I , 7 ( 1 998) .
The ongoing debate regarding the constitutionality of racial preferences
for purposes o f affirmative action often focuses on whether the reasons
for being especially su spicious of invidious racial discri mination arc
equally

applicable

to

"benign "

preferences .

To a large extent,

contemporary di sputes over racial preferences tend Lo pi t two di fferent
concepti ons of equal protection in the context of race agai nst each other.
The

Hopwood majority, as well as Justice Scalia, essential ly rely on the

"colorblind principle, " which holds that any consideration of race in
governmental decision making, other than for strictly remedial purposes,
is presumptively unconstitutional . This conclusion may arise for some or
all of the following reasons: such consideration of race is inconsi stent
with th e

original

understanding of

equal

protection, is premised on

assumptions of racial inferiority, denigrates the individual through the use
of irrelevant and racially based stereotypes, is immoral, is stigmatizing, or
leads to enduring racialism. Arguably, Justice Powell applied a so fter
version of the colorblind principle in

Bakke, concluding that all racial

classifications must be strictly scrutinized, but that the non-remedial
interest of diversity in education could justify a limited use of racial
preferences.

A competing approach favored by many academics, and

partially reflected i n the opinion of Justice Marshall in Bakke, i s known
as the "anti-subordination principle," which holds that the use of race by
the government i s wrong only when it subordinates any racial group. The
colorblind principle exalts the rights of the individual, while

the

anti-subordination principle emphasizes the rights of racial groups. Both
of these principles usually lead to similar results i n cases of classic
invidious discrimination; however, they tend to produce diametrically
opposite

conclusions

in

the context

of affirmative action.

The

anti-subordination approach has been definitively rejected by the courts.
Thus, the j udicial debate, as reflected by

Hopwood, has focused o n

whether the pure colorblind approach of Justice Scalia or the more
moderate colorblind approach of Justice Powell in Bakke should prevail.
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Justice Harlan's oft-q uoted language is a v e ry po werful entreaty for the Court to
recognize the equal constitutional rights of all people on a race neut ral basis. He
writes that:
[T]here is n o caste he re.

Our c o n s ti tution is color-blind, and

neithe r kno w s n o r tole rates classes among citizens . In respect of
civil-rights, all citi zens are eq ual before the law. The humblest is
the peer of the most powerful . The l a w regards man as man, and
takes no acco unt of his surroundings o r of his color when hi s civil
rights as guarantied by the supreme l a w of the land are involved.46
Notwi thstanding this entreaty, J us tice Harlan did not abandon notions of
racial superio rity wi th respect to societal i n te raction between the races. With the
simultaneous granti n g of equal constitutional rig hts, Justice Harlan did not fail to
pay homage to the continued dominance of the white race .47 H e reass ures both

Id.

at 5-7; Chris

K.

Iijima,

Swimming From the Island of the Colorblind: Deserting an ill

conceived Constitutional Metaphor, in Symposium Using law and Identity to Script
Cultural Production, 1 7 LoY . L . A .

ENT. L. J . 5 8 3 ( 1 997):
Unfortunately, the colorblind myth of racial vision confuses the
ideological end to racial hierarchy with what already exists. That is, the
prescriptive ideal of a "colorblind" society, in which racism and White
supremacy are eradicated, has been transformed by judicial fiat into " a
condition of societal denial," creating the illusion that racial hierarchy has
been eliminated. Indeed, "denial is a pervasive symptom of contemporary
American racism." And, of course, the denial of reality merely
perpetuates the condition of racial subordin ation.
Id. at 591 . See also other discussions of constitutional color-blindness, REvA B . SIEGEL, The
Racial Rhetorics of Colorblind Constitutionalism: The Case ofHopwood v. Texas, in RACE
AND REPRESENTATION: A FFIRMATIVE ACTION 29 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin, eds.,
1 998); CHARLES R. LAWREN CE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK: MAKING THE
CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE A CTION 67-87 (1997); Cedric Merlin Powell, Blinded by Color: The
New Equal Protection, the Second Deconstruction, and Affirmative Inaction, 5 1 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 191 (1997); JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
POLITICS, CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN A ME R IC A ( 1 99 6); ANDREW KULL, THE COWR-BLIND
CONSTITUTION ( 1 992).
4 6 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559.
47 Gabriel J . Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L.
REV. 1 5 1 , 1 57 ( 1 996).
Harlan's comments about the Chinese in the Plessy dissent strike the
modern ear as racist. Harlan, of course, was well aware of the
discrimination imposed upon Chinese by the national government; they
could neither immigrate nor become citizens, disadvantages imposed on
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h imself and his constituency that
[t]he white race deems itsel f to be the domina� t race i n th i s
_
country. And s o it i s , in prestige, i n achie vements. m edu c a t _i on, m
wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, i t w i l l continue to be for a l l
time, i f it remains true t o its great heri t age, and holds fast to the
principles of consti tutional l i berty .48
After 58 years the Court abandoned Plessy 's se p arate but eq ual ' doctrine
w i th its landmark desegregation decision in Bro wn v. Board of Education . -19 Brown
represented a clear departure from the Court ' s prior interpre tation of the
constitutional validity o f state-sponsored segregation .50 The Court decisively
'

no other race at that time. Harlan must also have known that th i s federal
discrimination perpetuated a system of d i s ad va ntage imposed hy the
states. Aliens "ineligible to citizenship," a category that was essenti ally
limited to Asians, were subject to various legal disabilities, such as
prohibitions on entering licensed professions and owning real property.
However, Harl an's reaction to disadvantages imposed on Chinese by law
was not that they should be invalidated according to his color-blindness
principle. In this respect, Harlan's response not only failed to comport
with modern arguments about the anti -subordination purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it did not even satisfy the notion of simple formal
equality. Instead, Harlan made what seems to have been an early
"underinclusiveness" argument similar to that found in modern equal
protection analysis: the law was irrational because it burdened one
despised minority but not another, and the one that was not burdened was
even more worthy of segregation from Caucas ians.

Id. at 1 57 - 1 5 8 .

48

49
50

Plessy, 1 63 U . S . a t 559.
Brown v . Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 ( 1 954).
This departure was not totally unexpected. During the 1 8 years preceding the

Brown

decision, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund systematically litigated graduate school
desegregation cases. See State of Missouri v. Gaines, 305 U.S. 337 ( 1 93 8)(Furthering of
the 'separate but equal' doctrine, the Court ordered the S tate of Missouri to either admit

Lloyd Gaines to its School of Law or provide an equi valent facility within the State.
Unfortunately, Gaines' mysterious disappearance mooted any further action i n this case);

Pearson v. Murray, 1 8 2 Atl. Rpt. 590 ( 1 936)(orderin g the admission of Donald Murray to
the University of Maryland Law School because there were no other equal

educational

opportunities for Murray within the State); Sipuel v. B d. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332

U . S . 63 1 ( 1 948)(ordering the admission of Ada Lois S ipuel to the University of Oklahoma
School of Law);

McLaurin v. Okla. St. Regents for Higher Ed., 339 U . S . 637

( 1 950)(prohibiting the University of Oklahoma

from

imposing segregatist conditions on

McLaurin's admission, such as requiring him to " si t apart at a designated desk in an
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Chief Justice Warren ' s

renunciation of Plessy i n this context was c lear. He wrote that " i n the field of
public education the d o c trine of 'separate but equal ' has no p l ac e .
educational faciliti e s are inherently unequal."5 1

Separate

But, the Brown court only

discussed the psyc h o lo gical harm that African Americans suffered as a result of
se grega tion . 52

The Brown court failed to e x pressly repudiate the discussion in

Plessy regarding the constituti onal rights and privileges afforded to African
Americans in the p o s t-war amendments.53 Nor did the Brown court e n tertain Justice

anteroom adj oining the classroom; to sit at a designated desk on the mezzanine floor of the
library, but not to use the desks in the regular reading room; and to sit at a designated table
and to eat at a di fferent time from other students in the school cafeteria); S weatt v. Painter,
339 U . S . 629( 1 950)(holding that the new law school the State of Texas establi shed for
blacks was unequal to the legal educational facilities and opportunities available to white
students, and as a result compelled Sweatt's admission to the University o f Texas Law

School). See also

JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURT 62-79,

85-9 1 ( 1 994):

But while Sweatt had appeared to offer a way of winning without ruling
on the constitutionality of segregation, Mcwurin had seemed to present
the issue of s egregation and nothing else.

Nevertheless, saying that

McLaurin was being treated unequall y was not the same as deciding the
issue of segregation.

Of course, that might mean that all segregation

amounted to i nequality, which the Court c arefully avoided saying.

Id. at 77-78; CARL T. RowAN, DREAM MAKERS, D REAM BREAKERS: THE wORLD OF JUSTICE
THURGOOD MARSHALL ( 1 99 3 ) :
There was Marshall the sagacious strategist. Few of his cases tell more
about the skills, the personal dedication, the wit and sarcasm of Marshall
than this broadside attack on Jim Crow in higher education in Oklahoma
. . . . On January 1 4, 1 946, Ada Sipuel applied for admi ssion [to the
University of Oklahoma] . Marshall knew that an awful lot was at stake.

He still fumed o ver winning a trailblazing case, the Gaines lawsuit in
Missouri, on l y to have Gaines vani sh. In the case of Sipuel, Marshall,
Hall, and the other NAACP lawyers intended to go far beyond Gaines and
try to use the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for wiping out not only
"We'll give you tuition to go to school in a northern state," or "We' l l set
up a separate law school for you," but all forms of racial discrimination
in graduate and pro fessional educati on.

Id. at 1 45- 146.

5 1 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.

52 Id. at 494 ("To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.")

53

DONALDG. NIEMAN, PROMISESTO .KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANSANDTHE CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER, 1 776 TO THE PRESENT ( 1 99 1 ) :
While Warren had no doubt about the proper outcome, he was determined
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g v ariou mani f� station s
Harlan ' s concept of the color-blind constitution, althou
can social fabn c at the
of this concept were being i ncorpo rated into the Amen
time.54

to avoid "precipitous action that would inflame [ the white South ] more
than necessary." This concern rather than abstract legal principles shaped
his opinion in the Brown case, which was announced on May 1 7 , 1954.
To avoid antagonizing whites, Warren refrained from attacking
segregation as part of a c aste system that was designed to preserve white
supremacy and that w as on its face a denial of equal protection. Rather
than suggesting that Plessy had been wrongly decided and that
southerners had supported a blatantly unconstitutional institution for more
than a half century, he contended that recent developments had made
segregation incompatible with the guarantees o f equal protection. In
recent years public education had become far more important than it had
been when the Fourteenth Amendment had been adopted or when Plessy
had been decided. In fact, it now was "a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him adj ust normally to his
environment." Citing recent social science research, Warren argued that
segregation denied blac k children the full benefit of education and thus
put them at a considerable disadvantage.
Id. at 749.
5 4 See RICHARD KLUGER, discusses the relevance of the Brown decision in SIMPLE J USTICE
7 49 ( 1976 )("Did not mean he would be invited to lunch at the Rotary the followin g week.
It meant something more basic and important. It meant that black rights had suddenly been
redefined; black bodies had s uddenly been reborn under a new law. Blacks' value as human
beings had changed overnight by the declaration of the nation's highest court. At a stroke,
the Justices had severed the remaining cords of de facto slavery. The Negro could n o longer
be fastened with the status o f o fficial pariah. He was both thrilled that the signal for the
demise of his caste status had come from on high and angry that it had taken so long and first
ex acted so steep a price in s uffering"). See also JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE
COURTS 1 1 6 ( 1 994):
Nominally, the Court' s only legal directive in Brown was that states might
no longer segregate the races in schools. B ut in fact the decision
destroyed the edi fice of legitimacy upon which Plessy had placed
segregation, laid the foundation for the civil rights movement, and
revolutionized the notions of what courts, lawyers, and the law might do
to expand racial justice. And much more, including sening in motion
consequences for o ther minorities and disadvantaged groups besides
blacks, as well as suggesting how the law might be used to advance and
secure human rights in other countries.
Id. at 1 1 6.
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Although dormant for 58 years, the theory of the color-bl ind constitution
re-emerged in American j urisprudence and sensibilities after the Brown decision.55
The Supreme Court had not ignored Justice Harlan ' s theory of constitutional color
blindness. In fact, Civil Rights acti vists and members of the NAACP' s Legal
Defense and Education Fund embraced the c oncept as an effective method of
eliminating invidious racial discrimination from society, but did not fully address
its long term consequences .56 In the years fo ll owing Brown, the J ustices grappled
with the constituti onal dilemma underlying the implementation of race-based
remedial measures, while simultaneously fostering race neutrality i n the Court's
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. J ustice Powell and J ustice O' Connor
were at the forefront of thi s j udicial struggle, and both adopted the concept of the
color-blind constitution i n various contexts. 57 J ustice Powell ' s consistent support

55 See STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERIC A IN B LAC K AND WHITE:
ONE NATION lNDIVISIBLE l 01 ( 1 997).

Brown remains the most important S upreme Court decision in this
century. It marked the beginning of the end of the Jim Crow South . But
it was not the end of all laws separating the races, and indeed the Court
was clearly aware o f the limits of its power .

To have barred racial

classifications as a hasis for governmental action - as the

NAACP had

urged - would have meant, for instance, that state laws forbidding
interracial marri ages were also unconstitutional. Neither in 1 954, nor for
thirteen years thereafter, was that an i s sue the Court was willing to take
on . Brown was ahead of the public opinion curve, but not way ahead . .
. . Declaring the Constitution "color-blind" would likely have had another
long-term effect: later race-conscious policies would have run into
constitutional trouble. No court could have approved race-based hiring
at the Kaiser Aluminum

& Chemical Corporation; in Boston, Judge

Arthur Garrity could not have ordered busing to achieve racial balance in
public schools.

Both involved racial classifications, of which Justice

Harlan (it seems s afe to say) would

not have approved.

Id.

56 See generally, DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 1 776 TO THE PRESENT ( 1 99 1 ) ; HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA
A. PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES
3 84-3 89 (7Lh ed. l 998)(discussing non-violent methods used by civil right advocates by
eradicate insidious forms of racial discrimination); HOWELL RAINES, MY SouLis RESTED:
MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH REMEMBERED ( 1 977) (discussing a collection of

interviews with people who experienced various facets of the Civil Rights Movement,
including politicians, grass roots civil rights workers, educators , lawyers and policemen);
MI C HA EL L. LEVINE, AFRICAN

AMERICAN S AND CIVIL RIGHTS: FROM 1 6 1 9 TO THE PRESENT

166-208 (1996).

57

Koteles Alexander, Essay, Adarand: Brute Political Force Concealed as a Constitutional

Colorblind Principle, 39 How.L.J. 367, 376 ( 1 995).
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for this principle can be seen in his plurality opinion in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke,58 and his concurring opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick.59
The concept of constitutional color-bli ndness was resurrected in Supreme
Court j urisprudence by Justice Powell in his opinion in Bakke. 60 In Bakke, the
University of California, when faced with a challenge to its race-based medical
school admissions program, argued that the strict scrutiny analysis was i napplicable
because claims of "dis crimination against members of the white 'maj ority ' cannot
be s uspect if its purpose c an be characterized a s ' benign. ' "6 1 Justice Powell rej ected

Presumably, Justices Powell and O' Connor' s attraction to a colorblind
Constitution is grounded in the idea that it implies both legal and value
neutrality, and creates a symbolic appearance of inescapable logic. In a
vacuum, a colorblind Constitution is precisely what many would want in
any governing document, particularly with respect to the Equal Protection
Clause. Yet, the Court' s sudden rush to a colorblind principle, after over
two hundred years of ignoring such an egalitarian ideal, mi sses the

mark.

The resolution of legal issues involving race cannot be confined to the
realm of ideas.

Id.
58

Regents of the Univ. Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 ( 1 978).

59

Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U . S . 448 ( 1 980), overruled by Adarand Constructors v. Pena,

5 1 5 U.S. 200, 235 ( 1 995)("0f course, it follows

that to the extent (if any) that Fullilove held

federal racial classifications to be subj ect to a less rigorous standard, it is no longer
controlling").
60

See JOHN c. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. THE ERA OF JUDICIAL BALANCE

469 ( 1 994).
On the one hand, Powell concluded, it was simply "too late in the day" to
forbid all racial preferences. Outlawing affirmative action would b e a
"disaster for the country. " Even if he were driven into an intellectual
corner, Powell would find a way to allow some affirmative action, under
some circumstances, at least for the time being. On the other hand, said
Powell, it would be equally disastrous to give carte blanche for racial
preferences. Public institutions would be vulnerable to the demands of
special interests.

Benefits would be carved up among competing

minorities in an ugly game of racial politics. Powell wanted to allow
some affirmative action, but also to constrain it, to keep it in check so that
race-consciousness would not become the norm. He wanted to preserve
for the future the ideal of a color-blind society.

Id.
61

Bakke, 43 8 U . S . at 294. See also Justice Powell' s p lurality opinion in Wygant v. Jackson

Board of Education, 476 U . S . 267 ( 1 986)

("The

C ourt has recognized that the level of

scrutiny does not change merely because the challenged classification operates against a
group that historically has not been subject to governmental discrimination.")
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this argument. In order to j ustify the u s e of a race-based c l assification, Justice
Powell concluded that the strict scrutiny test demands a "j udicial determination that
the burden he is asked to bear on that b a s i s i s precisely tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest."6 2 In addition to recognizing the administrative
difficulty inherent i n " v arying the level of j udicial review accordi n g to a perceived

' preferred' status of a particular racial or ethnic minority , " 63 he noted that
identification of members of "majority and ' mi nority' necessari I y reflect temporary
arrangements and political judgments ." 64 H e concluded that the guarantees of the
Equal Protection

C l ause

are avail ab l e to

" every person regardless of his

background."65
There are two themes in Justice Powell ' s plurality opinion that serve as the
underlying basis for h i s decision to apply the strict scrutiny anal ysis to evaluate the
constitutionality of race-based clas sificati o n s .

He initially recognized the

individualized nature of the rights guaranteed b y the Equal Protection Clause.66 The

62

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 2 9 9 ("We have held that in 'order to justify the use of a suspect

classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both cons titutionally
permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is 'necessary

.

_

.

to the

accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.").

63 Id. at 295.
64 Id. at 295.

By hitching the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to these transitory

considerations, we would be holding, as a constitutional principle, that
judicial scrutiny

of classifications

touching on racial

and ethnic

background may vary with the ebb and flow of political forces . Disparate
constitutional tolerance of such classifications well may serve to
exacerbate racial and ethnic antagonisms rather than alleviate them.
[citation omitted] Also, the mutability of a constitutional principle, based
upon shifting political and social j udgments, undermines the chances for
consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to the next,
a critical feature of its coherent interpretation.

Id. at 298-99.
65
66

Id. at 299.
B ut see Adarand Construc tors v. Pena, 5 1 5 U . S . 200, 2 3 9 ( 1 995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
In my view, government can never have a "compelling interest" in

discriminatin g on the basis of race in order to "make up" for past racial
discrimination in the opposite direction. [citation omitted] Individuals
who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made
whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a
creditor or a debtor race. That concept i s alien to the Constitution ' s focus
upon the individual, . . . and its rejection of dispositions based on race, .
. . or based on blood, . . . . To pursue the concept of racial entitlement -
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embodiment of Justice Powell ' s neutral interpretation of the post-war constitutional
amendments was forcefully articulated in Bakke:
If it is the indi vidual who is entitled to judicial protection against
classifications based upon his racial o r ethnic background because such
distinctions i mpinge upon personal rights, rather than the indivi dual only
because of h i s membership in a particular group, then constitutional
standards m a y be applied consistently . Political judgments regarding the
necessity

for

the

particular classification

constitutional balance, Korematsu

v.

may

United States,

be

weighed

323

U.S.

in

the

2 1 4 ( 1 944),

but the standard of j ustification will remain constant.67
C o n s i stent with the S upreme Cou rt s post B rown interpretation, Justice Powell
'

-

arg u e d that the rights afforded by the Equal Protection Clause are "guaranteed to
the individual.

The rights established are personal rights."68

To preserve their

meaning, each individual, regardless of race or ethnicity, must have an equal
opportunity to assert these rights and privi leg e s . 69 This theme is consi stent in post-

even for the most admirable and benign of p urposes - is to reinforce and
preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race
slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are
just one race here. It is American.

Id. at 239.
Bakke, 438 U . S . at 299.
68
Id. See also Missouri v . Jenkins, 5 1 5 U . S . 70, 1 20-2 1 ( 1 995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Indeed, Brown I itself did not need to rely upon any psychologic al or

67

social-science research in order to announce the simple, yet fundamental,

truth that the government cannot discriminate among its citizens on the
basis of race . . . . As the Court's unanimous opinion indicated: " [l]n the
field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." (citation omi tted)
At the heart of this interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause lies the
principle that the government must treat c i tizens as individuals , and not
as members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups. It is for this reason that
we must subject all racial classifications to the strictest of scrutiny, which

[Hirabayashi
United States, 323

(aside from two decisions rendered in the midst of wartime,
v.

United States, 320 U.S . 8 1 ( 1943); Korematsu
U.S. 2 1 4( 1 944)] has proven automatically fatal.

v.

Id.

69

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90. ("The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing

when appl ied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another
color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal").
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Brown decisions.70
Similar themes are al so apparent from J ustice Powell ' s concurring opinion
in Fullilove. In Fullilove, J ustice Powell applied the strict scrutiny test to evaluate
the constitutionality of a minority set-aside program. Pursuant to an amendment to
the Public Works Employment Act of 1 977, the statute required that "at least 1 O per
centum of the amo unt of each grant shall b e expended for min ority business
enterprises."71

The

Plaintiffs,

who

were

h eating

and cooling

c onstruction

contractors, filed an Equal Protection action chall enging the facial validity of the
minority set-aside provi sion .72 The majority upheld the facial validity of the statute
by applying a hybrid equal protection anal y s i s which was influenced b y the Court's
deference to Congressional decision-making authority.73 The Court described its
analytical reasoning as a two-step process which focused on
whether the obj ectives of this legislation are within the power of
Congres s . If so, we must go on to decide whether the limited u se
of racial and ethnic criteria, in the context presented, i s a

70 See Metro Broadc asting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U . S . 547, 602 ( 1 990) (O'Connor, J., with C.J.
Rehnquist, Justice

S calia and Justice Kennedy,

disscnting)("At the heart of the

Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government
must treat citizens 'as in di vi duals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or
national class"').

7 1 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U . S . 448, 454 ( 1 980).

72
73

Id. at 455.

The Supreme Court in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 ( 1 990), used a similar

analysis when evaluating the constitutionality of a FCC program that used racial preferences
in the assignment of broadcast licenses. Justice Brennan ' s opinion set forth an intermediate
scrutiny test to evaluate the constitutionality o f this race-based preference with added
deference afforded to the validity of the legislation because of its Congressional origin. In

Metro Broadcasting the Court concluded that:
benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress - even i f those
measures are not "remedial" in the sense of being designed to compensate
victims

of . past

governmental

or

societal

discrimination

-

are

constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important
governmental

obj ectives within

the power

of Congress

and

are

substantially related to achievement of those objectives.

Id. at 548. The Supreme Court in Adarand overturned both of these decisions to the extent
that they were based on the application of an erroneous constitutional standard. In Adarand,
the Court held that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local

governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scruti n y . In other
words, such classifications are constitutional only is they are narrowly tailored measures that
further compelling governmental interests." Ada rand, 5 1 5 U.S. 200, 227 ( 1 995).
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constitutionally permissible means for achieving the congre s sional
objectives and does not violate the equal protection component o f
the Due Process Clause o f the Fifth Amendment. 74
Consistent with h i s opinion in Ba kk e , i n Fullilove Justice Powell reiterated
his commitment to a racially neutral interpretation of the con stit u tion . 75 He stressed
that "[r]acial classifications must be assessed u n der the most stringent level of
review because immutable c haracteristics, which bear no relation to i ndi vi dual merit
or need, are irrelevant to almost every governmental deci sion. "76 In this regard, the
presumption of constitutional invalidity inherent in the use o f rac ial c l assifications
was rebutted by the j ustification of "eradicating the continu i ng e ffects of past
discrimination identified by Congress ."77 Notwithstanding his firm belief in the
racial neutrali ty of the Constitution, Justice Po well also acknowledged the necessity
for recognition of "narrowly defined circumstances"78 to defeat the arg ument that
the strict scrutiny tes t i s "strict in theory, but fatal i n fact."79
The second theme apparent from J ustice Powel l ' s plurality opinion in
Ba kk e is found in h i s i nterpretation of the plain meaning of the l anguage of the

Equal Protection Claus e . 8° First, he noted that the meaning of '"equal protection o f

74 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473. The Supreme Court has stated that "[ t]his Court' s approach
to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as Lo equal
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." Weinberger v. Wicsenfcld, 420 U.S.

636, 638, n.2 ( 1 975). See also Fullilove, 448 U . S . 448, 496 (Powell, J . concurring) ("The
Equal Protection Clause, and the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, demand that any governmental distinction among groups must be
j ustifiable.")

75 Note that the Adarand decision overruled Fullilove ("Of course, it follows that to the
extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal racial classifications to be subject to a less rigorous
standard, it is no longer controlling") Adarand, 5 1 5 U . S . at 235.

76 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 496.
77 Id. at 496. Although Justice Powell noted that "this Court has never approved race
conscious remedies absent j udicial, administrativ e, or legislative findings of constitutional

or statutory violations," unquestionably Congress "has the authority to identi fy unlawful
discriminatory practices, to prohibit those practices, and to prescribe remedies
to eradicate
their continuing effects . " Id. at 497, 502.

7 8 Id. at 496, n. I .
79 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 507.
80

See also Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 8 1 , 1 00 ( 1 943)("D
istinctions between citizens

�ol�ly ?ecause of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose
mst1t�t10n � are f?un?e� upon the doctrine of equalit
y. For that reason , legislative

class1ficat1on or d1scmnmation based on race alone
has o ften been held to be a denial of
.
equal protection." ).
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the law, ' is susceptib l e of varying interpretati o n s . "81 Citing Justice Holmes, Powell

argues for the use o f ' p arol evidence' such as "circumstances and the time" 82 to

assist in his interpretation of this phrase.83 H o w ever, defined b y words such as
"fair, j u st"84 or "equal i n status, achievement, o r a particular quality ,"85 the tenn

equal does not have the interpretative elasticity to incorporate group c haracteristics
8
into its parameters. 6 The i mplication is that t h e equal protection afforded by the

Fourteenth Amendment i s neutral and "framed i n u n i versal terms, without reference

to color, ethnic origin, or condition of prior servitude."87

81

Regents of the

Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U . S . 265, 284 ( 1 978).
at
284.
Id.
83 When interpreting the definition of the word ' discrimination' as used in §60 1 of Title VI,
Justice Powell cited Justice Holmes' proposition that " [a] word is not a crystal, transparent
and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and the time in which it i s used." Id. at 284.
84
WEBSTER'S THIRD N E W INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 766 ( 1 9 86).
85
WEBSTER'S THIRD NE W INTERNATION AL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 767 ( 1 986) . B ut see the tenn 'equality' as interpreted by Aldous Huxley
( 1 894- 1963), who wrote that "[t)hat all men are equal is a proposition to which, at ordinary
times, no sane human being has ever given his assent." The Idea of Equality, PROPER
STUDIES (1927), reprinted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MODERN QUOTATIONS 1 09 n. 1 0
(ed. Tony Augarde 1 99 1 ) .
86
See Statement by S tate Representative W.P. Jencks from Clarion and Jefferson Counties
to the Pennsylvania Legislature on January 23, 1 87 6 urging ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment:
By the first section i t is intended to destroy every distinction founded
upon a difference in the caste, nationality, race or color or persons who
have been or may be born in and subject to the j urisdiction of the United
States, which had found its way into the laws of the Federal or S tate
Governments which regulate the civil relations or rights of the people. No
law shall be made or executed which does not secure equal civil rights to
all. In all matters of civil legislation and administration there shall be
perfect legal equality in the advantages and securities guaranteed by each
State to every one here declared a citizen, without distinction of race or
color, every one being equally entitled to demand from the States and
State authorities full security in the enj o yment of such advantages and
securities . . . . the first section declares the civil rights of the black to be
equal to those of the white. . . .
82

CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU,
AMENDMENT

87

THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTEENTH

1 9 ( 1 981 ).

Bakke, 438 U.S . at 293 .

See Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 8 1 , 1 00
( 1 943)("Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very
nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.
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The origin o f Justice Powell ' s defi n ition of equality can be traced to the
natural rights phil o sophy espoused by the framers of America' s most che ished
�
documents. The natural rights theorists look to the l anguage of the Dec l aration of
Independence as one of the first articulations o f th i s principle.
On July

4,

1 776,

the

Congre s s

u n an imously

adopted

the

Declaration of Independence drafted by Tho mas J cffcrson, with a
newly recognized principle that was to re vol utionize the U n i ted
States in the years 1 865-68, that ' a l l men arc created equa l , ' and
with a solemn recognition of the natura l rights basis o f our
fundamental rights. 'All men , ' wrote J e fferson. 'arc endowed by
their Creator with certain unal ienable R i ghts, that among them are
' 88
Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happi n e s s .
Professor Chester J . Antieau argue s that "the emphas i s upon e q ual it y of
right provided the basis in 1 866-68 for the Eq ual Protection C l au se of the
Fourteenth Amendment."89 For example, Profe s s or Anticau cites co mmentary from
the debates held on this matter during the Thirty-Ninth Congress to s u b s tantiate this
position. "On January 1 0, 1 866, Representati ve John F. Farnswort h , a Republican
from Illinois, told the House: 'When our Fathers, when they framed the Dec l aration
of Independence, dec l ared that all men inherited the same rights' it meant that

' so

far a s these natural rights were concerned, that one man was equ a l to any other

For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has often
been held to be a denial of .equal protection .").
88

CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED S IGNIFICANCE

OF

THE

FOUR TEENTH

AMENDMENT 70-7 1 ( 1 997)
The natural, fundamental rights belongin g to citizens by the Privileg es and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend ment were implicit ly
to be

equally shared and enjoyed. S ince at least Cicero , it has been
unders tood
that equality of natural rights is of the essenc e of a shared human
ity. This
was well understood by Ameri ca' s Found ing Fathers. James
Wi l s on . . .
wrote: "The natural rights of man belon g equal ly to
all." It is clear that
the Re��blican leaders in �� Thirty-Ninth Congress
were commi tted, b y
the Pnvileges and Immunities Claus e, n o t only
to protecting natur al,
_
fundamental nght
s, but also to ensure there by the tradit
ional equa lity o f
such right s. Th e First Section of the Fourteent
h Amendme nt w a s almo st
_
e�trrely (except �or the first sentence) the
prod uct of Representati v e J ohn
mgham o� Oh1 0. I� 1 857 Bingham
had ass ured Congres s th at t
he
natu�al or mherent :1ghts which belo
ng to all men irres pect ive o
f all
_
constitutional regulations, are by the
Con stitu tion guaran teed

�

Id. at 243.
89 Id. at 7 1 .
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During the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, S e nator Charles

Sumner of Massachusetts articulated the n ormalizing component of the principle of
equality. His definition of equality leaves no room for doubt regarding its scope:
These are no vain words. Within the sphere of their influence no
person can be created, no person c an be born, with civil or political
privileges not equally enjoyed by all his fellow citizens; nor can
any institution be established recognizing di stinction of birth . Here
is the great c harter of every human bei n g drawing vital breath upon
this soil, whatever may be his condition and whoever may be his
parents.

He may be poor, weak, humble or black; he may be

Caucasian, J e wish, Indian or Ethiop i an race; he may be of French,
German, Engl i s h, or Irish extracti on; but before the constitution all
these distinctions disappear.

He is not poor, weak, humble or

Black; nor i s h e Caucasian, Indian or Ethiopian; nor is he French,
German, Engl i s h or Irish. He is Man, the equal of all his fel low
men.

He is one of the children of the State, which, l ike an

impartial parent, regards all its offsprings with an equal care. To
some it may j ustly allot higher duties according to higher
capacities; but it welcomes all in its equal, hospitable board. The
State, imitating the Di vine justic e , i s no respecter of persons. 9 1
The Supreme Court' s rejection of benign and invidious uses of racial
classifications is con si stent with this narro w definition of 'equality .' The Court has
noted that constitutional equality

mandates neutral application of the rights

afforded thereunder. S uc h decisions lead to arbitrary application of constitutional
rights which i s contrary to the basic goal of encouraging certainty through a racially
neutral interpretation of the constitution.92 Justice O' Connor noted that
[a]bsent searc h ing j udicial inquiry into the justification for such
race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what
clas sifications are ' benign' or 'remedial ' and what classifications
are in fact moti vated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or

90 Id.

9 1 Id. at 239-40.

92 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 5 1 5 U . S .

200, 227 (1995). ("These ideas have
long been central to this Court' s understanding of equal protection, and holding 'benign'
state and federal racial classifications to different standards does not square with them. ' [A]
free people whose in stitutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality,' ibid., should
tolerate no retreat from the principle that government may treat people differently because
of their race only for the most compelling reasons.")
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simple racial politics. Indeed, the p urpose �f strict scruti� y is to
.
'smoke out' i llegitimate uses of race by assunng that the leg1slat1ve
body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a
highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the mc� n s chosen
.
'fit' this compell ing goal so closely t h at there 1s 1 tt le _ r no
�
possibility that the motive for the c las s i fi c ati on was 1lleg1umate
racial prej udice or stereotype.93

�

Similarly, Justice O'Connor has been a consi ste n t supporter of
constitutional color-blindness. Her majority o pi nion i n City of Richmond v.
Croson,94 her maj ority opinion inAdarand,95 and her d i sse nt in Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCc96reflect this philosophy. For example, J u st i c e O'Connor echoes J u s tice
Powell's views on the individualized nature o f the rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment in the majority opinion s he au th ored in Croson . Justice
93

City of Richmond v. J . A . Croson Co., 488 U . S . 469, 493 ( 1 989).

94 J.A Croson Co. , 488 U.S. 469 ( 1 989).
95 Adarand, 5 1 5 U.S. at 227

The three propositions undermined by Metro Broadcasting all

derive from the basic principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution protect persons, n o t groups.
principle that

all

governmental

action

It

follows from that

based on race

-

a group

classification long recognized as "in mos t circumstances irre l e vant and
therefore prohibited," (citation omitted ) - s hould be subjected lo detailed
judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the
laws has not been infringed.

Id. See also Koteles Alexander, Essay, Adarand: Brute Political Force Concealed as a
Constitutional Colorblind Principle, 39 How. L.J . 367 , 376 (Fall 1 995) :
Justice O' Connor' s attempt i n Adarand to advance a colorblind
notion of the Constitution betrays the Court' s impartiality.
minimized.

S l avery and segregation are disregarded.

History i s

Ameri can legal

history and precedent is dismissed. The tensions inherent in the political
process, particularly in the context of race, are forgotten. By failing to
consider these fundamental historical facts, a colorblind application of
equal protection will not promote the venerable idea that all men be

In other

treated equ�lly before the law, but will p erpetuate the status quo.

?�

�well and O' Connor' s rush to a colorblind principle at
�1story, accom?lishes the same objective that the "all

w r s, Justic s P

�

th1� J uncture m

dehberate speed . concept was intended to accomplish in Brown 11

kee�

Id.

_

to

�e bu:de� of achieving racial harmony or equality on the victims

(poht1cal nunonty) and not the perpetrators (political majority).

96 Metro Broad., I nc . v. FCC, 497 U.S 547 ( 1 990
.
) (O' Connor , J ., dissent1ng
) , overruled m
part by Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 5 1 5
·

·

U . S . 200 ( 1 995) .

·
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O' Connor notes in Croson that "[t]o whatever racial group these citizens belong,
their 'personal right s ' to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by
a rigid rule

erecting

race

as the

sole

c riterion

in

an

aspect

of public

decisionmaking."97 S ubsequently, in her d i ssent in Metro Broadcasting, she rejects
the use of group characteri stics to determine the applicability of consti tutional rights
and privileges. S h e argues that in
the Constitution' s guarantee of equal protection lies the s imple
command that the Government must treat citizens ' as individuals,
not 'as simp l y components of a racial, religious, sexual or national
class . . . . S o cial scientists may debate how peoples' thoughts and
behavior reflect their background, but the Constitution provides
that the Government may not allocate benefits and burdens among
individual s

based on the assumption

that race or ethnicity

determines h o w they act or think.98
Justice O ' Connor' s color-blind interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause also reflects t h e second theme advanced by Justice Powell which focuses on
the plain meaning of constitutional equality. 99

In Croson, she adopted Justice

Powell's argument in Bakke that "[t]he guarantee of equal protection c annot mean
one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a
person of another c olor."100 Justice O ' Connor reiterated her commitment to race
neutral constitutional equality in the dissenting opinion she authored in Metro
Broadcasting.

Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice

Kennedy, Justice O ' C onnor' s continued advocation of a color-blind interpretation
of the constitution would not allow the Court to abandon strict scrutiny in favor of
a lesser standard of review when evaluating race-based classifications implemented
pursuant to Congre s s ional mandate. She argued that
Social scientists may debate how peoples' thoughts and behavior
reflect their b ackground, but the Constitution provides that the
Government may not allocate

benefits and burdens

among

individuals based on the assumption that race or ethnicity

97

See l.A. Croson Co. , 488 U . S . at 493.

98

Metro Broad. Inc. , 497 U . S . at 602.

99

Justice O' Connor' s view of color-blindness extends beyond mere constitutional

protections. In her dissenting opinion in Metro Broad. Inc. , she writes that " [ a] s a Nation
we aspire to create a society untouched by that history of [racial and ethnic] exclusion, and
to ensure that equality defines all citizens' daily experience and opportunities as well as the
protection afforded to them under law." Metro Broad. Inc. , 497 U . S . at 6 1 1 .
100

J.A . Croson Co. , 488 U.S. at 494.
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determines how they act or think.

To uphold the challenged

programs, the Court departs from these fundamental principles and
from our traditional requirement that racial classifications are
permissible only if necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling interest. Thi s departure marks a renewed toleration of
racial classifications and a repudiation of our recent affirmation
that the Constitution' s equal protection guarantees extend equally
to all citizens. 1 0 1
When evaluating t h e justifications for t h e u s e o f any race-ba s e d
class i fications, regardless o f w h ether such classificati ons disadvantage minority
group members or members of dominant racial groups, Justice O' Connor argues
.1
that such inquiry must be governed by strict scrutiny 02 B y refusing to recognize
a distinction between benign 1 03 and invidious forms of racial discrimination,

104

101

Metro Broad. Inc. , 497 U . S . at 602 (O'Connor, J . , dissenting).

rni

In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued for a application of a "rel axed" standard of review

of "race-conscious classifications designed to further remedial goal s." J.A. Croson Co. , 488
U.S. at 5 3 5 . In response, Justice O ' Connor noted that
!elven were we to accept a reading of the guarantee of equal
protection under which the l evel of scrutiny varies according to the ability
o f di fferent groups to defend their interests in the representative process,
heightened scrutiny would still be appropri ate in the circumstances of this
case. One on the central arguments for applying a l e s s exacting standard
to 'benign' racial classi fi cations is that such measures essentially involve
a choice made by dominant racial groups to disadvantage themselves. If
one aspect of the judiciary' s role under the Equal Protection Clause is to
protect 'discrete and insular minorities' from maj ori tarian prejudice or
indi fference, [citation omitted] . . . some maintain that these concerns are
not implicated when the ' white majority' places burdens upon itself.
(citation omitted) The c o ncern that the political maj ority will more easily
act to the disadvantage o f a minority based on unwarranted assumptions
or incomplete facts would seem to militate for, not against, the application
of heightened judicial s crutiny in this case.

Id. at 495-96.
llJJ

In her dissent in Metro Broad. Inc. , Justice O' Connor rej ects the concept of 'benign

racial classi fications.' Metro Broad. Inc. , 497 U . S . at 609 - 1 0 . She noted that
' [ blcnign racial classification' is a contradiction i n terms . Governmental
disti nctions among citizens based on race or ethnicity, even in the rare
circumstances permitted by our cases, exact costs and carry with them
substantial dangers . To the person denied an opportunity or right based
on race, the classificatio n i s hardly benign. The right to equal protection
of the laws is a personal right, sec Shelley

v.

Kraemer, 334 U . S . I , 22, 6 8

S .Ct. 836, 846, 9 2 L.Ed. 1 1 6 1 ( 1 948), securing t o each individual an
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Justice O' Connor argued that the consti tutional "standard of review under the Equal

Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or b enefi tted by

a particular classification." 1

05

In Adarand, Justi c e O'Connor recognized ' three general propositions' that

serve as the evolutionary framework for the Court' s equal protection paradigm.1 06

Id.
1 04

immunity from treatment predicated simply on membership in a particular
racial or ethnic group. The Court's emphasis on "benign racial
classifications" suggests confidence in its ability to distinguish good from
harmful governmental uses ofracial criteria. History should teach greater
humility. Untethered to narrowly confined remedial notions, "benign"
carries with it no independent meaning, but reflects only acceptance of the
current generation's conclusion that a politically acceptabl e burden,
imposed on particular citizens on the basis of race, is reasonable. The
Court provides no basis for determining when a racial classification fails
to be "benevolent." By expressly distinguishing "benign" from remedial
race- conscious measures, the Court leaves the distinct possibility that any
racial measure found to be substantially related to an important
governmental objective is also, by definition, "benign." Depending on the
preference of the moment, those racial distinctions might be directed
expressly or in practice at any racial or ethnic group. We are a Nation not
of black and white alone, but one teeming with divergent communities
knitted together by various traditions and carried forth, above all, by
individuals . Upon that basis, we are governed by one Constitution,
providing a single guarantee of equal protection, one that extends equally
to all citizens .
J. A . Croson Co. , 488 U.S. at 493("Absent searching judicial inquiry in to the

justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what
classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by
illegitimate notions of racial i nferiority or simple racial politics.")
1 05 J. A. Croson Co. , 488 U.S. at 494.
1 06 Adarand Constructors v . Pena, 5 1 5 U.S. 200, 223 (1995). Skepticism is the first
proposition identified b y Justice O' Connor. Citing a number of opinions, including Justice
Powell's plurality in Wygant, Justice Burger' s opinion and Justice Stewart's dissent in
Fullilove. This proposition is defined as " ' [a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria
must necessarily receive a most searching examination."' Id. at 223. The second
proposition, as discussed in the text is consistency. Id. Finally, the third proposition is
congruence which requires the Court to conduct the "[e]qua! protection analysis in the Fifth
Amendment area . . . the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 224.
In A darand, Justice O'Connor noted that the anomalous holding of the Court in
Metro Broad. Inc., rejected these three general propositions. This inconsistency between
Metro Broad. Inc. 's application of an intermediate level of scrutiny to evaluate race-based
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O f primary importance t o her adoption o f a c o lor-blind constitutional i nterpretation
i s the second proposition which recognizes the Court ' s desire for j urisprudential
consistency107 in its i nterpretation of the Equal Protection Clause . J ustice O' Connor
argues that constitutional consistency requires that '"the standard o f review under
the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or
b e nefitted by a particular classification, '

[ c i tations omitted]

i.e.,

all

racial

c l as sifications reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly
scrutinized."108

Ultimately,

Justice

O ' C o nn or

recogn ized

the

synergistic

relationship between the individualized n ature of constitutional rights and the
necessity for removal of racial and ethnic distinctions between such i ndi viduals in
order to enforce those rights using a neutral y ard stick. She concluded that
The three propositions undermi n e d by Metro Broadcasting all
derive from the basic principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment s to the Constitution protect persons, not gro u p s .

It

follows from that principle that all g overnmental action based on
race--a

grou p

classification

long

recognized

as

'in

most

circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited,' Hirabayashi,
[citation omitted]--should be subj ected to detailed judicial inquiry
to ensure that the personal right to e q u al protection of the laws has
not been infringed.

These ideas h av e l ong been central to this

Court's understanding of equal protection, and holding ' b e n i gn '
state and federal racial classificati o n s t o different standards does
not square with them.

' [A ] free p eople whose institutions are

founded upon the doctrine of equal i ty , ' [citation omitted ] , should

c l assifications, and the Court' s reliance on the strict scrutiny test serves as the basis for lhe

Court' s decision to overrule Metro Broad. Inc. S e e id. at
107 Adarand, 5 1 5 U . S . at 229-30.

227.

The principle o f consistency simply means that whenever the government
treats any p r on unequally because o f his or her race, that person
has

��
� l�J ury that falls squarely within the language and s piri t of the
Constitut10� s guarantee of equal protecti on. It says nothing
about the
_
.
ultunate v a1 d1ty o: any p ticular law; that determination
is the job of the
_
�
c urt applymg tnct �crutm�. The principle of consist
?
ency explains the
�
_
circ�ms �nces m which the mJ ury requir ing
strict scrutiny occurs. The
_
apphcat1on o f stnct
s cruti�y , in turn, d etermines whether a co m
_
pel li ng
governmental � nterest J Usttfies the inflic tion
of that injury.
suffer�d

1

.

Id.
1 08

Cons isten cy does recognize that any indivi
dual suffers an inj ury
when he or she is disadvantaged by the
g o v ernment because of his or her
race, whatever that race may be.

Adarand, 5 1 5 U . S . at 224.
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tolerate n o retreat from the principle that government may treat
people differently because of their race only for the

most

compellin g reasons. 109
The strict scrutiny test -- which requires the Court to find that the racial
classification i s n arrowly tailored in furtherance of a compelling state interest -- is
the constitutional y ardstick the Court reli e s u p o n to equalize the scope of Fo urteenth
Amendme nt protection s .
classifications

trigger

Constitutional race neutrality requires that racial

strict

scrutiny

notwithstanding their either

punitive,

beneficial, or remedial impact on a parti c u l ar group. To function as an effective
me asure of constitutional

equality,

the

Court ' s race neutral

constitutional

interpretation removed the vagaries of j udicial interpretation by incorporating a
bright line standard i n to the equal protection p aradigm. 1 10
The Supreme Court' s acceptance of a racially neutral interpretation of the
1 1
Equal Protection Clause has not gone unchallenged. 1 The most ardent opponent

109 Id. at 227.
1 10

By eliminating race as a determining factor in the equal protection p aradigm the Court,

however, also disregards any comparative value j udgment between uneq ual treatment
imposed on majority and minority group members without regard to the historic or social
antecedents of such conduct.
rn

Bakke, 438 U.S . at 327 (Brennan, J., White, J . , Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.,

concurring)("claims that law must be 'colorblind' or that the datum of race is no longer
relevant to public policy must be seen as aspiration . . . . for reality rebukes us that race has
too often been used b y those who would stigmatize and oppress minorities.")

See also Keith E. Sealing, The Myth of a Color-Blind Constitution, 54 WASH. UNIV. J. OF

URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW 157, 1 98-99 ( 1 998).
I f the Constitution is to be viewed as color-blind, as Justices

Thomas and S c alia and the Podberesky and Hopwood panels would have
it, the debate ends at that point.

A color-blind Constitution would require

us to solve the problems of a color-conscious society with color-blind
solutions. Undergraduate and graduate admissions programs would, thus,
be totally precluded from considering race as a "plus" or otherwise.
However, the Constitution as drafted and amended by the Bill o f Rights,

and as interpreted by early case law such as the Dredd Scott decision, was

not a color-blind document. Instead, it saw Eighteenth Century A merica
in colors of white, black, red, and yellow, denying citizenship to all but
the white. Indeed, it protected and guaranteed the institution of s lavery
into the nineteenth century without actually using the term " slave" or
"black. " Despite occasional exceptions, such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins, this

Constitution gave minorities none of the protections one would expect
from a color-blind document.
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of this phi losophy was Justice Thurgood M arsha l l w hose advocacy of an i ntegrated
society was tempered by knowledge that c on ti nu i ng vestiges o f s l avery were
operating to pre v e nt African Americ a n s
economic gain s .

1 12

from realizing soc i a l . pol itical. and

At no time was the need for J U d 1 c 1 a l i n terven t 10n into the

desperate situation faced by African Americans more appare n t than i n the fight to
preserve race-based affirmative action programs. The Bakke cas e represented the
turning point in the Court ' s utilization of t h e Eq ual Protection C l ause to remedy
i mpact of years of segregation by adopt i n g a c o l or- bl i nd i n t e rpretation of the
constitution.
Justice

M arshal l

voiced

his

o p p os ition

to the

Court ' s

color-hi ind

interpretat i on of the c on stitution. He argued that
If onl y the principle of color-bl i ndne ss had been accepted by the
maj ority in

Plessy in 1 896, we w o u l d not be faced w i t h t h i s

pr oblem in 1 978. We must re member, however, that this pri nc i p le
appeared only in the dissent. In the 60 years from Plessy to Brmrn.
o urs was a Nation where, by law , i ndi v iduals could be given

With the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress had a cl ear
opportunity to make the Constitution truly color-blind. Congress could
have included color-blind language, mandating that "no di scrimination
shall be made on account of race or color. " Such color-blind l an g u age
was presented and debated, but eventuall y r ejected on the gro u nd s o f
political

expediency.

Congress

instead

substituted a n ambiguous

standard--equal protection--that would be continuously debated, but
would have the immediate advantage of attacking the South's Black Codes
without putting at risk segregated schools or bans on interracial marriage s .
Progress came in the

form of affirmative action programs

designed to r emedy the present effects of discrimination in a wide range
of contexts, and in a manner that could n o t be color-blind.

Id.
112

Th urgood Marshall contemplating his decision in

Bakke.
The dream of America as the melting pot has not been realized by

Negroes - either the Negroes did not get i nto the pot, or he did n o t get
melted down. The statistics on unemp loyment and other statistics quoted
in the briefs ... document the vast gulf between White and Blac k America.
Thal gulf was brought about by centuries of slavery and then by another
century in which, with the approval of this Court, states were permitted
to treat Negroes ' specially.'
PHll.LIP J. COOPER, BATTLES ON THE BENCH: CONFLICT INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 1 6
( 1 995) (citing Thurgood Marshall, Memorandum to the Conference, April
Br ennan Papers, Box

465, p. 2-3).

13,

1 978,
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For us now to say that the

principle of color-blindness prevents the Uni versity from giving
' special' con sideration to race when this Court, in 1 896 licensed

the states to continue to consider race , is to make a mockery of the

principle of ' equal j u stice under law . '

1 13

In addi tion to attacking the Court ' s disregard for the desperate plight of
African Americans, J u stice Marshall also attacked the notion that ' equality' can
only be achieved by ignoring group characteristics that result in unequal treatment.
Although Justice

Marshall

agreed that

group characteristics

"were neither

significant nor relevant to the way in which persons should be treated," 1 1 4 he argued
that "[ w]e are not yet al 1 equals, in large part because of the refu sal of the Plessy
Court to adopt the principle of color-blindn e s s . It would be cruelest irony for this

court to adopt the dissent in Plessy now and h o l d that the University must use color
blind admission s ." 1 1 5 The irony that Justice Marshall recognized has its origin in
the Court's incorporation of race neutrality into the Equal Protection Clause. The
Equal Protection C l au s e was specifically adopted to provide a constitutional barrier
against state action that maintained the den i grated status of African Americans
following the Civil War.
Justice Marshal l ' s advocacy of racial inclusion within constitutional
decision-making i s consi stent with his support of remedial affirmative action
programs. He noted that
[i]t is because of a legacy of unequal treatment that we n o w must
permit the institutions of this society to give consideration to race
in making decisions about who will h o l d the positions of influence,
affluence, and prestige in America . For far too long, the doors to
those positions have been shut to Negroes.

If we are ever to

become a ful l y integrated society, o n e i n which the color of a
person ' s skin will not determine the o p portunities available to him
or her, we must be willing to take ste p s to open .those doors. I do
not believe that anyone can truly look into America's past and still
find that a r�medy for the effects of that past is impermissibl e . 1 16

1 1 3 Id.

(citing Thurgood Marshall, Memorandum to the Con ference , Apri l 1 3 , 1 978,
Brennan Papers, Box 465 , pp. 1 -2).
114
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v . Bakke, 438 U . S . 265, 355 ( 1 978).
115
PHil..LIP J. COOPER, B ATILES ON THE BENCH: CONFLICT INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 1 7
( 1 995) (citing Thurgood Marshall, Memorandum t o the Conference, April 1 3 , 1 978,
Brennan Papers, Box 465 pp. 2-3).
116
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 40 1 -02.
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ls that several notab le
A review of current members of the Court revea

race neutrality w h en
Justic es have adopted a strict concept of constituti o n al
For examp le,
interpreting the protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.
cations by state
Justice Clarence Thomas striden tly opposes the use of racial classifi
actors . 1 17 He argues that
these programs may have been motivated, i n part, by good
intentions cannot provide refuge from the principle that under our
Constitution, the government may not make distinctions on the
basis of race. As far as the Constitution i s concerned, it is
irrelevant whether a government' s racial classifications are drawn
by those who wish to oppress a race or by those thought to be
disadvantaged. There c an be no doubt that the paternalism that
appears to lie at the heart of this program is at war with the
principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our

1 17

See Samuel Marcosson, Colorizing the Constitution of Originalism: Clarence Thomas

at the Rubicon, 1 6 LAW & INEQ. J. 429, 482 ( 1 998)

The issues become real when posed to Thomas, an African-American, an
originalist and a miscegcnist. And we hear those i s s ues differently when
discussed in his voice.

Hence, a deep irony: the very act of Justice

Thomas proclaiming the color-blindness ideal demonstrates the flaw i n
the principle, itsel f. I n h i s capacity

as

a Supreme Court Justice, Thomas

constitutes the ultimate representation of the law he urges must be color
blind.

Yet, the vastly di fferent voice with which he speaks about the

Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates co nc l usi vel y that, at some level, he

is not blind to color. I am amazed Thomas can be deaf to the difference

race produces in his o w n judicial voice.

Thomas' color-blindness it

appears, must be accompanied by an equally poten t color-deafness.
But if we remain oblivious to the differen c e Clarence Thomas'
color makes, we impoverish our understanding of the i ssue . In the same
way, any law professin g to be 'blind' to the reality of color - Clarence
Thomas' law - is also i mpoverished. The impoverishment of the law,
however, is only part of the harm of color-blindness; color-blindness also
rein forces the foundational premises of assumed white s upremacy. As
discussed, originalism perpetuates racism by taki ng race i n to account in

the wrong way: it actually renects and places primary emphasis on the

Framers· white supremac ist racism.

Though non-origin alist, color

blindness also perpetuates racism but in a different way: by failing to
account for race a race-conscious society.

Id.
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118

Justice Scalia i s al so an advocate of a strict concept of constitutional color
blindness that pres u mptively rej ects all j ustifications for the u se of race-based
classifications as i l l egitimate .

With his c haracterization of a racially conscious

society as one which fosters the creation of a "creditor or a debtor race," 1 1 9 Justice
Scalia rejects the argument that there could be any constitutionally compelling

j ustifi cati on for the u s e of race-based classificati ons. Ju stice Scalia argues that "[i]n
my view, government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on
the basis of race in order to ' make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite
direction."120

118
119

5 1 5 U . S . at 240 (Thomas, J., concuning).
at 239 (Scalia, J . , concurring).
Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination
should be made whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such
thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. That concept is alien to the
Constitution's focus upon the individual, sec Arndt. 1 4, § I ( " [ N )or shall
any State . . . deny to any person" the equal protection of the laws)
(emphasis added), and its rejection of dispositions based on race, see
Arndt. 1 5 , § 1 (prohibiting abridgment of the right to vote "on account of
race"), or based on blood, see Art. III, §3 ( " [NJo Attainder of Treason
shall work Corruption of Blood"); Art. I, §9, cl. 8 ("No Title of Nobility
shall be granted by the United States " ) . To pursue the concept of racial
entitlement--even for the most admirable and benign of purposcs--is to
reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that
produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of
government, we are just one race here. It i s American.

Adarand,
Id.

Id.
120

Id. at 239 (Scalia, J . , concurring in part and concurring in judgment). See also City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520-2 1 ( 1 989)(Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgement).
The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as
nothing compared with the difficulty of eradicating from our society the
source of those effects, which is the tendency--fatal to a Nation such as
ours--to classify and judge men and women on the basis of their country
of origin or the color of their skin. A solution to the first problem that
aggravates the second is no solution at all. I share the view expressed by
Alexander Bickel that ' [t]he lesson of the great decisions of the S upreme
Court and the lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at
least a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral,
unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society.'
Id. ; A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY O F CONSENT 133 ( 1 975). At least where state or local action
is at issue, only a social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and
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ill . REBUTIING THE PRESUMPTION

OF

CONSTITlJTIONAL !NV ALI DITY

The color-blind constitutional p ara digm requ ires an initial fi ndi ng of a
constitutionally compellingjustification for the u se of ra�e- as� d c ri teria. Supreme
Court case law i s clear - the goal of remedying present d1scn mmat1on or the effects
of past discriminatory practices can serve as a basis for u se o f race ba sed
.
Proof of broad societal discrimination will
not withstand
c l ass ific at i ons . 1 2 1
constitutional scrutiny. The discriminatory c onduct must have been pe rformed by
_
the party implementing the race-based remedy. Add i t ion a lly , strict scrutiny
mandates that the race-based rem e dy be narrowly tailored to addre ss the hann
resulting from such past di scriminatory conduct.

�

.

_

-

The origin of this analytical paradi gm can be traced to J u stice Powell ' s
plurality opin i on i n Bakke. In his opinion J u stice Powell rec og n i ze d th e rac i all y
neutral character of the Equal Prote c tion Clause, but also ac kn o w led ge d that
compelling justifications for t he use of rac ial c lassifications may be raised. After
rejecting three of the Uni vers i ty s justifications as inc o n sis ten t with the guarantees
122
of the Equal Protection Clause,
Justice Powell concluded that the U n i ve rsi ty s
use of racial preferences in Bakke w as justified by i ts attempt to attain a di verse
'

'

limb--for example, a prison race riot, requiring temporary segregation of inmatcs, [ citation
omitted] --can justify an exception to the principle embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment
that " [o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens," Plessy v. Ferguson, 1 63 U.S. 537, 559 ( 1 896)(Harlan, J., dissenting)(citations
omitted).
1 21 W
ygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U . S . 267, 286 ( l 986)(0' Connor, J . , concurring in
part and concurring in j udgment). ("The Court i s in agreement that . . . remedying past or
present racial discrimination . . . is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the
remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative action program.") Pursuant to Justice
Powell's opinion in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 ( 1 978) an
unresolved question remains regarding the continued permissibility of diversity is a
compelling justification for the use of race-based criteria.
122
Bakke, 438 U . S . at 305-3 1 1 . Justice Powell decisively rejected the Uni versity's use of
race-based preferences to reduce "the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities
in medical schools and in the medical profession. " Id. at 306. He concluded that the
Constitution prohibits " [p ]referring members of any one group for no reason other than race
or ethnic origin . " Id. at 307. He also found that the University could not j ustify its
program by its efforts to eliminate the effects of societal discrimination. Justice Powell
argued that in the absence of "constitutional or statutory viol ations, it cannot be said that the
government has any greater interest in helping one individual than in refraining from
harming another." Id. at 308-09. Finally, Justice Powell did not find any correlation
between the u ��ersity '_s �ace-based ad�ssions program and its goal of increasing the
_ m underserved communities. Id. at 3 1 o.
number of physicians willmg to practice
.

.

.
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student body . 123 J ustice Powell noted that the use of race in this c ontext was "a
constitutio nally permi s sible goal for an institution of higher leaming."124

A

maj ority of Court h a s not, however, adopted this rationale. 125
Justice Powell also addressed a j ustification for the u s e of race b ased
-

classifications that has been more readily accepted by members of t h e Court. He
recognized that racial c lassifications used as remedial measures may overcome the

presumpti on of constitutional invalidity a s s o ciated with the u s e of race-based
c lass ifi cati on s. 126 To serve as constitutionall y permissible j ustifi cation, such use
must be limited to remedial efforts developed "to redress the wrongs worked by

2
1 3

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 3 1 1- 1 2. See discussion regarding the importance o f diversity within
the academic environment, Bakke, 438 U.S . at 3 I 1 - 15 ("The forth goal asserted by petitioner
is the attainment of a di verse student body. This clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal
for an institution of higher education. Academic freedom, though not a specifically
enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment. ")
124 Id. at 3 1 1 - 12. Note that the university could not s atisfy the additional requirement of the
standard.
125
See generally Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996)
We agree with the plaintiffs that any consideration of race or ethnicity by
the law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body i s not
a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Powell's
argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never represented
the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case. Moreover,
subsequent S upreme Court decisions regarding education state that
non-remedial s tate interests will never j ustify racial classifications.
Finally, the classification of persons on the basis of race for the purpose
of diversity frustrates, rather than facilitates, the goals of equal protection.
Justice Powell's view in Bakke is not binding precedent on this
issue. While he announced the judgment, no other Justice joined in that
part of the opinion discussing the diversity rationale. In Bakke, the word
"diversity" i s mentioned nowhere except in Justice Powell's single-Justice
opinion. In fact, the four-Justice opinion, which would have upheld the
special admissions program under intermediate scrutiny, implicitly
rejected Justice Powell's position. (citations omitted) Thus, only one
Justice concluded that race could be used solely for the reason of
obtaining a h eterogenous student body. As the Adarand Court states, the
Bakke Court did not express a maj ority view and is questionable as
binding precedent.
Id.
126

A state actor may overcome the presumption of invalidity by presenting a "strong basis
in the evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary." J.A. Croson, 488
U.S. at 500 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277).
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ice Pow�ll note� tha� " [t]he
specif ic instances of racial discri mination."12 7 _Jus�
s m am�h?rat�ng, ��
State certainly has a legitimate and substantial � nter� �
ied d1_ scnrrunat10� .
elimin ating where feasible, the disabling effects of i dentif _ _
is ts a more wid� ly
Thi s extremely narrow except ion to the strict scrutin y analys
.
than the divers ity
accepted j ustification for the use of race-based class i ficatio ns
..

rationale . 129
color
In Bakke, Justice Powell relied upon this limited exceptio n to the

blind interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to rej ect the Univers � ty ' s
argumen t that racial classifications may be u sed to remedy societ�l
discri mination. 130 He cites several problems associated with efforts to remedy this
type of societal injury. He initially notes that a societal remedy would impose a

Bakke, 438 U .S. at 307. But see Professor Donald E. Lively, Equal Protection and
Moral Circumstance: Accounting for Constitutional Basics, 59 FORDHAM L.REV . 4 8 5 , 5 1 8
127

( 1 99 1 )
Current equal

protection doctrine actually may be more
Unlike that

pernicious than the d i scredited jurisprudence o f Plessy.

decision, which accommodated dominant convention at the expense o f
minority interests, current fourteenth amendment j urisprudence impedes
a political majority, or c ollective bargaining process, when it attempts to
cure its own past wrongs through remedial legislation. The notion that
race presumptively cannot be a factor in official action may represent a

desirable ideal, but it frustrates any constitutional remediation of present
inequities. By making race unmentionable, even though its presence and
implications arc pervasive, contemporary equal protection doctrine
seriously confounds even the most limited aims of the fourteenth
amendment. Moreover, equal protection jurisprudence not only fails to
vindicate, but actually i mpairs minority interests.
,

Id.
1 2"

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.

1 2"

There is one primary distinction between the constitutional color-blindness theorized by
s
Ju tice O' Connor and the doctrine advocated by Justice Powell - the extent to w h i c h the

pre s u mption of constitutional invalidity may be rebutted . Justice O'Connor rej ec ts the
argument that diversity can serve as a justification for the u s e of racial classification s. She
supports the use of racial classi fi c ations in the limited context of remedying particularized
acts o f past discriminatory conduct. "Modem equal protection doctrine has recognized only
one such interest: remedying the e ffects of racial discriminat ion." Metro Broad. , Inc. v.
FCC 497 U . S . 547, 6 1 2 ( 1 990). But see Adarand Constru c tors v. Pena, 5 1 5 U . S . 200, 239
,

( 1 99 5 ) ( Scalia. J.. concurring i n part and concurring in j udgment). ("In my view,
government can never have a 'compell ing interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in

order to 'make up' for past discrimination in the opposite direction . " )
I lO
Th c u mvcrs1"ty argued th at one goaI o f its
. race-bas ed admissions program w as to
"counter( ing] the effects of societal discrimination." Bakke, 438 U . S . at 306.
·

.
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burden on innocent individuals in favor of "persons perceived as members of
relatively victimized groups." 1 3 1 Such a burd e n , Powell argues, cannot be imposed
"in the absence of j udicial , legislative, or admini strative findings of c o nstitutional
or statutory violati o n s . " 1 32 He also places a c o n tinuing obligation on the j udiciary
to monitor the remedy to avoid a remedy that i s both "ageless" in its application
and overly broad in scope. 133 "After such fin dings are made, the governmental
interest in preferring members of the inj ur e d groups at the expe n s e of others is
substantial, since the legal rights of the victims must be vindicated. " 1 34
Justice Powell reiterated this view e ight years later in

Wygant

v.

Jackson

Bd. of Educ. , 1 35 fi nding that racial classifi c ations used to remedy societal
discrimination are too "amorphous a basis" 1 36 for overcoming the c o nstitutional
presumption of invalidity . 137 He noted in

Wygant that

[n]o one doubts that there has been serious racial discrimination in
this countr y .

But as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal

remedies that work against innocent people, soc ietal discrimination
is insufficient and over expansive. In the absence of particularized
findings, a c ourt could uphold remed i e s that are ageless i n their

1 3 1 Bakke , 438 U.S. at 3 07 . ("To hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore
reserved for violations of legal rights int o a privilege that all institutions throughout the
Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal
discrimination.")

1 32 Id. at 307.
133 Id. ( Al so , the remedial action usually remains s ubj ect to continuing oversight to assure
"

that it will work the least harm possible to other innocent persons competing for the
benefit.")

1 34 Id. at 307.
1 35 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 ( 1 986).
1 36 "[S]ocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially

classified remedy."

Wygant,

476 U.S. at 276.

See also Bakke, 438 U . S . at 307 ("In the

school [desegregation] cases, the States were required by court order to redress the wrongs
worked by specific instances of racial discrimination. That goal was far more focused than
the remedying of the effects of ' societal discriminati on,' an amorphous concept of injury that

may br ageless in its reach into the past.")
1 37 See also Justice Powell' s concurring opinion in Fullilove v. Klutnick 448 U.S. 448

(1 980) in which he argued that a Congressionally mandated race-based ' set aside' program

was justified by Congressional efforts to remedy past discrimination in the area of public
contracting.

Notwithstanding the absence of Congressional, administrative or j udicial

findings of past discrimination, Justice Powell concluded that "Government does have a
legitimate interest in ameliorating the disabling effects of identified discrimination ."

Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 497 (Powell , J., concurring) .

AKRON LAW

254

[Vol. 33:2

REVIEW

reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the
future. 138
Although the body of law in this area continues to develop, Supreme Court
precedent does offer meaningful guidance for the development and implementation
of voluntary race-based affirmative action programs aimed at remedying specific
acts of past discrimination. Although decided on other grounds, t .l'J the Court in
Wygant began to narrow the parameters o f this exception to the general
constitutional standard. The Wygant dec i sion resol ved a di spute in Jackson,
Michigan between the Jackson Board of Education and the Jackson Education
Association, a teachers union, regarding a p rovision in a col lecti ve agreement. The
disputed provision which was developed to address "racial ten sion in the
community"140 provided that in the event l ayoffs became necessary, the Board of
Education would attempt to achieve a situation in which "at no time will there be
a greater percentage of minority personnel l aid off than the curren t percentage of
minority personnel employed at the time o f the layoff."141 Subsequently, non
minority teachers, with seniority, who were l aid off filed an actio n alleging among
other violations, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause . 1 4 2
Justice Powell authored the plurality opinion in Wygant in which he
rej ected the School Board ' s argument that the layoff provision was j ustified to
"remedy prior discrimination against minorities by the Jackson S c h ool District in
h iring teachers."143 He concluded, in oppo sition to a strong dissent authored by
Justice Marshall, 144 that in the absence of a factual predicate for a finding of past
discrimination, such voluntary conduct v iolated the Equal Protection Clause .
1 3 8 Wygant, 476 U. S . at 276.

1 39 In prior litigation, "[b ] oth courts concluded that any s tatistical disparitie s were the result
of general societal discrimination, not of prior dis c rimination by the Board. The Board now
c ?nt�n�s �at, given anot�er opportunity, i t could establish the e x i s tence of prior
d1scnrrunat10� . Although th1s argument seems belated at this point in the proceedings, we
_
need not cons1der the question
si�ce we conclude below that the layoff provi si on was not
_
_
ally appropnate means of ach1evmg
even a c o mpelling purpose." Wygant, 476 U.S. at

;���
140

141

142

Id. at 270.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 272.

1 43 Id. at 277.

1 44 Id. at 295 97. Justic e Marsh
all, joined in his dis sent by Justices Brenn an and Blac mun
�
k
'
argued that [t]he record and extra-record matenal s
that we have b efore us persuasively
.
suggest that the plurahty has too quickly assum ed
the absence of a l e g1t1mate factual
.
.
predicate' even under the P1ura1tty
.
s own view for affimnati ve action m
the Jackson
schools." Id. at 297.
·

·

,

·

'

.

·
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Justice Powell concluded that "a public employer l ike the Board must ensure that,
before it embarks on an affirmative action program, it has convincing e vidence that
remedial action is warranted . That is, it mu st have s ufficient evidence to j ustify the
conclusion that there has been prior discrimin ation ."145
As a result, the plurality ' s position was that "the trial court must make a
determination that the employer h ad a strong basis in evidence for its
conc lusion that remedial action was neces s ary ."146 Justice O ' Connor, in her
concurrence, refined the p l urality ' s test for evaluating the factual predicate for the
use of a voluntary affirmative action program b y noting that the program may be
implemented prior to a j udicial determination of past discrimination . She noted
"that a contemporaneous or antecedent finding of past discrimination by a court or
other competent body i s not a constitutional prerequisite to a public employer' s
voluntary agreement to an affirmative action program."147 The only prerequisite to
the implementation of a voluntary program i s that "the public actor has a firm basis
for believing that remedial action is required." 148
factual

Justice O' Connor argued that there was merit in the factual predicate set
forth by the School Board for the imposition o f the remedial program. She noted
that "remedying past or present racial discrimination by a state actor i s a sufficiently
weighty state interest to warrant the remedial u se of a carefully constructed
affirmative action program." 149 The School Board asserted that the purpose
underlying the remedial program was its "desire to correct apparent prior
employ ment di scrimination against minorities while avoiding further litigation."150
145
146

147

Wygant, 476 U . S . at 277.

Id. at 277.

Id. at 289 "A violation of federal statutory or constitutional requirements does not arise
a finding; it arises when the wrong i s committed. Contemporaneous

with the making of

findings serve solely as a means by which it can be made absolutely c ertain that the
governmental actor truly is attempting to remedy its own unlawful conduct when it adopts

an affirmative action plan, rather than attempting to alleviate the wrongs suffered through
general societal discrimination. (citations omitted) Such findings, when voluntarily made by
a public employer, obviously are desirable in that they provide evidentiary safeguards of
value both to nonminority employees and to the public employer itself, should its affirmative
action program be challenged in court. If contemporaneous findings were required of public

employers in every case as a precondition to the c o nstitutional validity of their affirmative
action efforts, however, the relative value of these evidentiary advantages would diminish,
for they could be secured only by the sacrifice of other vitally important values." Id. at 289-

90.
148

149
150

Id. at 286.
Id.
Id. at 287.

[Vol. 33:2

AKRON LAW REVIEW

256

1 5 1 e fforts to bring s at action into
A1though the Court encourages voluntary
m nda es, both the D 1 s t 1ct Court and
comp1iance with const itution a] and statut ory
.
.
mqu1ry mto the leg1umacy of the
r
prope
the
make
not
"did
1s
Appea
of
rt
Cou
.
,, 1 2
B oard' s asserted remed ia1 purpose. 5

� �
�

�

�

The standard articulated by Justice Po well in Bakke for determining the
constitutionality of a state actor' s ability to i mplement vol u ntary race-based
affirmative programs was later tested by t h e Court in Croson .

The dispute in

Croson originated with the implementat i o n of a racial-preference government
contracting program by the City of Richmond, V irginia. The program was designed
to remedy past discrimination in the cons truction indu stry "for the purpose of
promoting wider participation by minority b u s in e s s enterpri ses in the construction
of public proj ects . " 153 The Minority B us i n es s Uti l i zation Plan (the "Plan") required
general contractors to "subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount o f the contract
to one or more Minority B u siness Enterpri s e s (MBE' s) . " 1 54
This case arose as a result of the C i ty ' s rejection of Croson ' s bid for the
"provision and installation of certain p1umbi n g fixtures at the city j ai l . " 155 Although
Croson attempted at obtain a bid from Continental Metal Hose, a M B E, the MBE' s
b i d was higher than those he obtained from other contractors . Acceptance of the
MBE's bid wou]d have raised the cost of t h e j ob by $7,663. 1 6, and t h e City refused
to increase the contract price to reflect t h i s cost. Thereafter, the City refused to
issue a waiver of the M B E requirement to Croson, and instead rebid the project.
Croson fi]ed

an

action under 42 U . S . C . § 1 983 c h a11enging the constitutionality of

the Plan "on its face and as applied in thi s c ase." 156
The procedural history of this c a s e reveals opposing s chools of thought
regarding the suffi c iency of the City ' s j u s ti fi c ati ons for its race-based remedial

Plan.

The District C o urt' s conclusion w a s i n accord with the City ' s position that

"national findings of discrimination in the c o n struction industry, when considered

15 1

S�e �egents of the Univ. of Cal. v. B akke, 43 8 U . S . 265, 364 ( 1 97 8 ) ("And our society
� J �nsprudence have always stressed the value of voluntary efforts to further the

an

obJ1 ect1ves of the law ") · Wygant 476 U S at 290 ( " Th
e value of voluntary comphance 1s
.
.
doubly important hen It IS a public emp l oyer tha
t acts, both becau se of the example its
a su pllon of responsibility sets and becau
v lu
se the remediatio n of governmental
d1scnrrnnatton IS of uniqu e importance. ").
1 52
Wygant, 476 U . S . at 293.
·

�

·

•

·

·

·

• .

? �� � I?

153

City of Richmond v . J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S . 469 478 ( 1 989)

154 Id. at 477.
155 Id. at 48 1 .
1 56
Id. at 483.

'
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in conjunction with the statistical study concerning the awarding of prime contracts
was due to past discrimination ' reasonable . ' " 1 57 The District Court, relying on the
deferential standard of review of Congressional deci sion-making estab l i shed by the
Court in Fullilove, upheld the validity of the P l an . The Fourth C i rc u i t Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court' s decision . The j u stifications articulated by the
City were viewed as ' reasonable' by both c ourt s .
A subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court, together w i t h the Court's
intervening decision in Wygant establi shed the basis for an opposing resolution of
this case. The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit' s deci sion, and remanded
the case for further consideration. Upon a second review, the Fourth Circuit closely
scrutinized the City' s j u stifications in accordance with the Wygant decision, and
ultimately found that the j ustifications could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
On remand, the Fourth Circuit concluded that vol untary race-based programs
implemented to remedy societal discrimination cannot be justified by "broad-brush
assumptions of historical discrimination."158

Instead, the City was required to

demonstrate "prior di scrimination by the government unit involved." 159
As a threshold matter, the Court concluded that the strict scrutiny test was
the appropriate evaluative tool for determining the constitutionality of the Plan,

notwithstanding its remedial purpose. 1 60 In accordance with the rationale of Bakke,

Justice O'Connor' s i n i tial inquiry focused o n whether the City engaged in "judicial,

legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations" 161
that would warrant

implementation of constitutionally permissible measures to

remedy past discriminatory conduct.

"Only then does the government have a

157

Id. at 484 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 779 F.2d 1 8 1 , 1 90 and n. 1 2 (4th
.
Cir. 1 985) [hereinafter Croson /]).
l
158
Id. at 485 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 882 F.2d 1 35 5 , 1 35 7 (4 h Cir.
1987) [hereinafter Croson //] ) .
1 59 J.A. Croson Co. , 4 8 8 U . S . a t 485 . ("In this case, the debate at the city council meeting

'revealed no record o f prior discrimination by the by the city in awarding public contracts
. . . . Moreover, the statistics comparing the minority population of Richmond to the
percentage of prime contracts awarded to minority firms had little or no probative value in
establishing prior discrimination in the relevant market, and actually suggested 'more of a

politi cal than a remedial basis for the racial preference. (citations omitted)").
160 J
.A. Croson Co. , 488 U . S . at 493. "Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to ' smoke
out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal
important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the
means chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the
motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype." Id.
161

J.A . Croson Co. , 488 U . S . at 497.
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anothe r. " 1 0 "
compe lling intere st i n favori ng one race ove r
The Court then engaged i n a c ompre h ens i ve analy s i s of each specific
6

j u st i fication raised by the C i ty . 1 .i To support i t s pri mary j u st i fi c a t ion for the Plan,
the City argued that "there was rac ial d i sc r i m i nation in the con stru c t i on i ndu stry 'm
th i s area, and the State, and around the n a t i o n . ' " 1 ° 1 J u stice O ' Co n n or art iculated an
eval uative standard for assessing the unde r l y i ng purpose of a vo l u n tary affirmati ve
action plan . She stressed that
[t]he factfinding process of leg i s l ati vc bod ies is

ge ne ral ly

e n t i t led

to a pre s u mption of reg u l ari ty a n d deferential re v i e w by the
j udici ary . (Citation omitted) But w hen a leg i s l a t i v e body c hooses
to employ a s uspect classificat i o n , i t cannot rest upon a

g e ne ral i zed

assertion as to the class i fication ' s re l e vance to i t s goal s . ( C i tation
omitted) A governmental actor c a nnot render race a l e g i t i mate
proxy for a partic ular condi tion mere l y b y de c lari ng t hat the
condition

exists.

(Citation

o m i tted)

The

hi story

of

rac ial

classificati ons in this country sugges t s that b l i nd j ud i c i a l d e feren ce
to legislati v e or executive pro n o u ncements of ne c e s s i ty has no
place in equal protection analysi s . (Citation o m i tted ) .

1 65

The Court noted that statements of discri mi nation "are of l i ttle probative value i n
establi shing identified discrimination in the Richmond constru c t i on ind u stry ." 1 66
In Croson, the underlying purpose of thi s Plan was not, however, evidenced by
particularized

past

discriminatory

conduct

sufficient

enough

to

wi thstand

constitutional scrutiny.
The City also relied on statistical disparities between t h e n umber of
m inorities within the construction industry and the population of R i chmond to

1 62
1 63

Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. V. Bakke, 435 U.S. 265, 308-09 ( 1 978).
"Th e District Court relied upon five predicate ' facts' i n
reaching i t s conclu sion that there

was an adequate basis for the

30% quota: ( 1 ) the ordinance declares itself to be remedial·
s ev�ral pr?ponents of t e �easure state
th eir vi � ws that there h ad
been pas
.
.
.
d1scnmmat1on m the construct10n industry; (3) mmonty busmess �s r�ceive d 0.67%
of prime
.
.
contracts form the city . s populauon; (4) there were very few mmonty contr actor
s in local
and state contractors ' associations; and (5) in 1 977, Congress made a determination
that the
effects of past discrimination had stifled minority participation in the construction
i n d u stry
nationally . " J.A. Croson Co. , 488 U.S. at 499.

(�)

1 64
1 65
166

�

Id.
Id.
Id.

at 500.
at 500-0 1 .
at

500.

�

;
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justify its race-based preference program. It supported this j ustification with the
Supreme Court' s recognition that appropriate statistical evidence may be indicative
of discriminatory c onduct.167 "In the employment context, we have recognized that
for certain entry level positions requiring min imal training, statistical comparisons
of the racial composition of an employer' s work force to the racial composition of
the relevant population may be probative o f a pattern of discriminatio n . " 1 68 There
is, however, an exception to this rule . 1 69 Where "special qualifications are
necessary, the relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating d iscriminatory
exclusion must be the number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular
task."170 This excepti on proved fatal to the City ' s ability to justify its remedial
program. The Court identified several deficiencies in the City ' s analysis. It noted
that the City "does n ot even know how many MBE' s in the relevant market are
qualified to undertake prime or subcontracting work in public construction projects .
... Nor does the city know what percentage o f total city construction dollars minority
finns now receive as subcontractors on prime contracts let by the city ."171
The Court also noted the lack of evidentiary support for the City ' s assertion
that the remedial program was necessary because "white prime contractors simply
will not hire minority firms ."172 The Court ' s re sponse was simply t h at "[w] ithout
any information o n minority participation i n subcontracting, it i s quite simply
impossible to evaluate overall minority representation in the city ' s construction
expenditures."173 The absence of evidentiary support was also apparent in the
City's assertion that "MBE membership in l ocal contractors' associations was
extremely low."174 The City failed to correlate these membership statistics with a
pattern of racially discriminatory conduct by the City or any p articipant in

167

See Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public S chools, 19 F. Supp.2d 449, 454 ( 1 998)

("Likewise, extremely low percentages of minorities, or non-minorities, in certain public
schools might raise an inference of discrimination. " (Citing Swann v. Mecklenberg Bd. Of
Ed. , 402 U.S. 1 , 26 (197 1 )).
168
J.A. Croson Co. , 488 U.S. at 501 .
169 J
.A. Croson Co. , 488 U.S. at 501 . ("There is no doubt that ' [w]here gross statistical
disparities can be shown, they alone in a proper case may constitute prima facie proof of a
pattern or practice of discrimination' under Title VII. (Citation omitted) But it is equally
clear that ' [w]hen special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to
the general population (rather than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the
necessary qualifications) may have little probative value.")
170
J.A. Croson Co. , 488 U.S. at 501-02.
171
Id. at 502.
172

Id.

1 73 Id. at 502-03 .
174 Id. at 503.
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Richmond' s construction industry.
For low minority membership in these associations to be relevant,
the city would have to link it to number of local MBE' s eligible for
membership. If the statistical disparity between eligible MBE's
and MBE membership were great enough, an inference of
discriminatory exclusion could arise. In such case, the c ity would
have a compell ing interest in preventing its tax dollars from
assisting these organizations in maintaining a racially segregated
construction market. 175
The final j ustification for Richmond' s remedial plan was summarily
dismissed by the Court. The Court stated that the "probative value" of the City's
assertion that "there had been nationwide discrimination in the construction
industry was extremely limited."176 Justice O ' Connor in Croson concluded that
" [w]hile the States and their subdivisions may take remedial action when they
possess evidence that their own spending practices are exacerbating a pattern of
prior discrimination, public or private, with some specificity before they may use
race-conscious rel ief."1 77 In addition to not being narrowly tail ored, 1 78 the Court
held that
none of the evidence presented by the city points to any identified
discriminatio n in the Richmond c onstruction industry . We,
therefore, hold that the city has failed to demonstrate a compelling
interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities on the
basis of race. To accept Richmond ' s claim that past societal
discrimination alone can serve a s the basis for rigid racial
preferences would be to open the door to competing c l aims for
'remedial relief' for every disadvantaged group. The dream of a
Nation of equal citizens i n a society where race is irrelevant to
personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of
shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable c laims of
past wrongs. 'Courts would be asked to evaluate the extent of the
prejudice and consequent harm suffered by various minority
gro�ps. Those whose societal i nj ury i s thought to exceed some
arbitrary level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential

1 1s
1 76
1 77
1 78

Id.
I.A. Croson Co. , 488 U . S . at 504.
Id.
Id.

at

507- 08.
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classifications . . . . ' (Citation omitted) We think such a result w ould
be contrary to both the letter and spirit of a constitutional provi sion
whose central command is equality . 1 79
The Court' s willingness to recognize that remedying specific acts of past
1iscrimination can serve as a constitutionally c ompelling j ustificatio n for the use
lf race-based classifications was also addre s se d in Ada rand. Thi s case represents
he culmination of 1 7 years of Supreme Court litigation on this issue . The j udgment
ssue by the Court in thi s case represents one of few uni fied pronouncements from
.he Court on the standard of re view required to e val uate equal protection chall enges
.o race-based affirmative action programs.
In Adarand, the plaintiff submitted the l owest bid to supply guardrails on
federal highway con struction project. The contract was instead awarded to a
Hispanic contractor who was certified by the S mall Business Admi n i stration as
"socially and economically di sadvantaged." 1 80 The subcontractor' s certification
made the prime contractor eligible for a financial incentive program available only
to general contractors who hired comp an i e s controlled by disadvantaged
individuals. The equal protection challenge to the government' s financial incentive
program raised by the plaintiff was defeated on a motion for summary j udgment.
The Court of Appeals, relying on the lenient standard of review fo r federal race
based preferences established by the Court i n Metro Broadcasting and Fullilove,
affirmed the District Court' s decision. 181
a

On appeal, the Supreme Court finally reached a consensus r egarding the
standard of review appropriate for assessing the constitutionali ty of federally
mandated racial classifications. Justice O'Connor initially rej ected any language
set forth in Metro Broadcasting or Fullilove that suggested that an intermediate
level of scrutiny i s the appropriate standard of review for e valuating the
constitutionality of governmental racial classifications. The Adarand deci sion also
broadened the holding i n Croson by making strict scrutiny analysis applicable to
classifications used by federal government actors . 1 82 In this regard, the Court held
179
180

181
182

Id. at 505-06.
Adarand Constructors

Id. at 210.
Id. at 222.

v. Pena, 5 1 5 U.S. 200, 205 ( 1 995).

With Croson, the Court finally agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment

requires strict
governments.

scrutiny of all race-based action by
But Croson of course had no occasion

state and local
to declare what

standard of review the Fifth A mendment requires for such action taken by
the Federal Government.

Croson observed simply that the Court' s
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that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal,

state, or local

governmental actor, must be analyzed by a re � ie ing court oder strict scrutiny.
':
�
In other words, such classifications are c o n st1tut10nal only if they are narrowly
tailored measures that further compelling governmental interest s . " 1 83

The Court further noted that the s t andard of review for equal protection
cl aims was not dependent upon the identity of the governmental decision-maker.
Specifically, the Court resolved the ques t i o n that arose after Fullilove regarding
whether

the

Court

constitutionality

should afford j ud i cial

deference

when

reviewing the

of Congressionally mandated racial classifications.

O' Connor clarified the Court ' s position by c oncluding that "to the e xtent

Justice

(if any)

that Fullilove hel d federal racial classifi c ations to be subject to a less rigorous
.
1 84
·
stand ard, it is
. no 1 onger contro11 mg.
,,

The Court was al so challenged to artic u l ate circumstances in which it would
find a compelling j ustification for the u s e o f race-based classification capable

of

falling within the exception to the concept o f c onstitutional color-blindness that had
permeated the Court' s post-Bakke dec i s i on s on affirmative action.

Justice

O ' Connor specifically responded to the c omplaint raised by J u stice Marshall in

Fullilove that "strict scrutiny is ' strict i n theory, but fatal in fact."' 185 Althou gh a

strong advocate of constitutional color-bl i n dn e s s , J ustice O' Connor acknowledged
that race neutrality has not fully integrated itself into the social fabric of American
society.

She noted that "[t]he unhappy p ersistence of both the practice and the

l ingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is
an unfortunate reality, and government i s n ot di squalified from acting in response
to it."1 s6
1:1nfortunately, the Court did not have an opportunity t o ful l y address this
.
.
issue m light of the lower courts' failure t o apply a heightened standard of proof to
evaluate the constitutionality of the

race-based components o f the SBA' s

government contracting program. 187 As a result of its deci sion to overrule

Metro

· �eatm�nt of an exercise of congressional
power in Fullilove cannot be
d1spos1t1ve here ,' because Croson 's
facts did not implicate Congress'
broad pow er under §5 of the Fourtee
nth Amendment.

Id.
8
1 3

ld. at 227.
Id. at 235 .
1 85
Id at 237 (quotmg Fulllove v. Klu
tzn ick, 448 U.S . 448 5 1 9 ( 1 980
.
) , overruled by
Adarand Constructors v Pena 5
1
5
U
S
.
. 200, ( 1 995 ) (Marshall J . , conc
'
1 86
urri ng)) .
Adarand, 5 1 5 U . S . a 237 .
1 87
Id. at 237.
1 84

·

·

'

�
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Broadcasting and Fullilove, Justice O' Connor remanded Adarand to the District
Court for a determination of whether the government's use of racial classifications
was justified by a compelling interest and narrowly tai lored to ach i e ve the goals
articulated by the program in accordance with the strict scrutiny analysis.188

IV. CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS

Al th ou gh few would argue that race discrimination or even the ve stige s of
past deJure discrimination have been eliminated from the American framework, the
ability to substantiate such claims is increasingly difficult. We no longer live under
a system of Jim Crow laws that clearly identify the players . In the absence of the

Because our decision today alters the playing field in some important
respects, we think it best to remand the case to the lower courts for further
consideration in light of the principles we have announced. The Court of
Appeals, following Metro Broadcasting and Fullilove, analyzed the case
in terms of intermediate scrutiny. It upheld the challenged statutes and
regulations because it found them to b e 'n arrowly tailored to achieve
[their] significant governmental purpose of providing subcontracting
opportunities for small disadvantaged b u siness enterprises.' 1 6 F.3d, at
1547 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals did not decide the question
whether the interests served by the use of subcontractor compensation
clauses are properly described as 'compelling.' It also did not address the
question of narrow tailoring in terms of our s trict scrutiny cases, by
asking, for example, whether there was 'any consideration of the use of
race-neutral means to increase minority business participation' in
government c ontracting, Croson, supra, at 507, 1 09 S.Ct., at 729, or
whether the program was appropriately limited such that it 'will not last
longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate,'
Fullilove, supra, at 5 1 3, 1 00 S.Ct., at 2792-2793 (Powell, J., concurring).
188 0
n remand, the District Court in Adarand concluded that although fi ndings of past
discriminati on in the federal construction contracting industry served as a compelling
justification for Congressional implementation of race-based set-asides, the program was not
narrowly tailored enough to overcome the strict s crutiny analysis.
I conclude that the statutes and regu lati ons implicated in the SCC
program, with respect to the races included as presumptively
disadvantaged, do not provide a reasonable assurance that the application
of racial criteria will be limited to accomplishing the remedial objectives
of Congress .... As such, they are not narrowly tailored to serve the interest
of eliminating discrimination in the construction industry.
Ada rand Constructors v. Pena, 965 F.Supp. 1 556, 1581 ( 1 997 ) . This decision was,
however, vacated with directions to dismiss by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 1 69 F.3d
1292, 1299 (1 999 ) .
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proverbial smoking gun, t h e Court ' s color-blind i n terpr� tatio� of the eq al
�
protection paradigm serves as substantial barrier to t h e continued 1mplementat10n
of race-based remedial affirmative action programs .

However, there are several

ways to defeat the argument t h at strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, fatal in fact . "
The first option available to race-based affi rmative action proponents h a s
littl e pragmatic appeal. U s i n g a strategy reminiscent of t h e one utilized by t h e
NAACP Legal Defense Fund during the 1 940's to end school desegregation, p u b l i c
institutions o f higher education could be encouraged t o implement race-based
remedial affirmative action programs in response to litigation challenging the
val id i ty of their existing admis sions programs . 1 89 Similar legal challenges i n t h e
area of municipal hiring have resulted i n voluntary rac e -based affirmative action
programs sanctioned by the c o urts through consent decrees. 1 90 Unfortunate) y, t h e
inefficiency o f this strategy is readily apparent. I n addi tion to being costly and time
consuming, educational institutions are well aware of the judicial and statutory
pro hibitions on racially discriminatory practices. The least of which is Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1 964, 1 9 1 which if violated may result in the eliminati o n of

189

See generally, Moti on to Intervene filed on behalf of minority students and affinnativc

action proponents in the cases filed by Gratz and Grutter agai n st the Univer sity of Mi c higan

.

Al th o ugh the District Court denied their motions to intervene i n the cases brought by Gratz
and Grutter challenging the race-based admissions programs utilized by the University's
Co l lege o f Literature and Law S chool, the Sixth Circuit i ssued an opinion in which it
consolidated these cases for the purpose of reversing the District Court's deci sio n

,

and

allowing the minori ty defendants to intervene in the action. The Sixth Circuit concluded that
the i ntervention would permit the introduction of "evidence o f past discrimination by the
Uni v ersi ty itsel f or of the disparate impact of some current admi ssions criteri a, and that these

may be i mp ortant and relevant factors in determining the legality of a race-cons c i ous
admi s sions policy

. "

Grutter v . B o l li nger 1 88 F.3d 394, 40 1 (6'h Cir. 1 999). See also ac ti o n

filed by civil rights groups on behal f o f African American, Hispanic and Fi lipino students
again s t the Uni versity of Cal i fo rnia at Berkeley on Feb. 2, 1 999.

The suit alleges that

Berkeley's admissions pol icies v i o late Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964 and have an

unj u s ti fied disparate impact on mi nority applicants. Seth Rosenfeld, UC-Berkeley sued over

mino rity admissions, San Francisco Examiner, February 3, 1 999, at A 7; Sara Hebel, Bias in
admissions charged at Berkeley, Chron. Of Higher Educ . , February 1 2, 1 999, at A 3 7 .
I'XJ

See generally, Local N o . 93, Intern. Ass' n of Firefighters, AFL-CIOC.L.C. v . City o f

Cl ev eland , 478 U . S . 5 0 1 ( 1 986); Boston Police S uperior O fficers Federation v. City o f

Boston, 1 4 7 F.3d 1 3 ( I " Cir. 1 99 8 ) ; McNamara v. City of Chicago, 1 3 8 F.3d 1 2 1 9 (Th Cir.
1 99 8 ) ; U nitcd States v. City of Miami, 1 1 5 F.3d 870 ( 1 1 'h Cir. 1 997).
191
The provisions of Title VI arc not all puniti ve . The regul ations issued by the Department
Ed
uc ation governing the ad mi n i s trati on of Title VI pro vi de that educati onal institution s
of
untarily implement affinnative action programs t o either " overcome the effe c ts o f
vol
may
prior di scri mination due to "race, color, or national origin . " "Even i n the absence o f past
"
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much needed federal fun ding. In this regard, e ven if evidence of past d i sc rimination
existed, prudent educational institutions would be

c o mpelled

to challenge every

attempt at maki n g such an admission in order to avoid liabil it y .
As a re s u l t the only remaining avenue for reli e f i s to seek C o n gressi onal
,

intervention and i mple me n tati on of race-based remedial action for instances of
discrimination and to eradicate the continui n g effects past discrimination in both the
public and private sectors of higher educat i o n . 192

The Court has previ ousl y

discrimination, Title VI provides that educational institutions may implement voluntary
measures aimed at overcoming the effects of conditions which resulted in limiting
participation by perso n s of a particular race, color, or national origi n . "
34 CFR
§ 1 00.3(b)(6)(i)-(iii) (1990).
1 92 For a discussion of j usti fications for government mandated affirmati ve action program
designed to address private discri mination in the area of government contracting, see Ian
Ayres and Fredrick E. Vars, When Does Private Discrimination Justify Public Affirmative
Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 577 (November, 1 998). Sec also CHR ISTOPHER EDLEY, JR.,
NOT AU. BLACK AND WH ITE: A FFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE, AND AM ERICAN VALVES 1 77
(1 996).
A government-imposed preference might be thought more acceptable on
the theory that, i f the justification for a preference embodies important
principles and aspirations, then government should lead; that regulating
abuses is not enough. Moreover, the aspiration of inclusion . . . has most
weight as regards public institutions where it is seen to be democratic and
to promote civic community. On the other hand, given that preferences
have a moral cost, some will argue that the moral injury is more grievous
if inflicted by one's own government - by the power of the state. This
latter view is currently the law, because the constitutional scrutiny of
government affirmative action is tougher than say, Title VII scrutiny of
private employer efforts. This approach honors private autonomy, but
also signals some moral ambivalence, making racial preferences wrong
for one actor but acceptable for another - wrong when people act
collectively through government; but acceptable when they act personally .
... This is unsatisfying. Surely i f the s tate stands idly by while my
neighbor inj ures me, I have strong grounds for complaint. The private
public distinction does not and cannot definitely resole the issue of our
responsibilities to one another. What works, in my view, is to engage in
the moral conversation about what those responsibilities are; then, having
decide d, ask what enforcement mechanisms are appropriate in light of a
variety of considerations - practicality, ethics, custom. It may be that we
decide to leave enforcement to social norms and informal community
standards of civility, or to religious or other community institutions. Or
we may decided that the state should be involved in a regulatory c apacity.
In race as in smoking, obscenity, abortion and elsewhere: we should not
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recognized that race-based affirmative action programs implemented by State
governments may withstand constitutional scruti � if th ey are des gn d o r me

�

�

� � �

�li

past discrimination or the present effects o f spec1f1c acts of past d1scnmm at 1 on .

If n arro w ly tailored, such programs may rebut the presumption of constitutional

infirmity inherent in the use of such an i nvidious classification as race. Although
the Court has eliminated race from the equal protection paradigm, the Court is not
forecl osed from utilizing race-based remedial mea s ures to counter the effects of past

discriminatory practices. 194

make the typical lawyer's error o f confusing the question of what is right
with the decision about the role of governmen t.

Id. For an alternative avenue of redress which relics on the intervention of the Executive
Branch of government, see, How President Clinton Could Advance the Higher Educational
Opportunities of Black Americans, 1 6 JOURNA L OF BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC.
50 ( 1 997).
If president Clinton is serious about retainin g affirmati ve action in,
as he

Id.

says, a 'repaired' form, he has it within his powers to form
a commission
of highly respected citizens and legal advocates to
make the most
powerful possib le case before the Supreme Court
for the constitutionality
of affirmative action procedures. Properly
armed with facts and hard
sociological data on the favorabl e i mpac
t of affirmative action on
American society, these experts will
make a compelling brief for the
proposition that affirmative action
i s in the public interest.
Pre sident Clinton could also instr
uct the Justice Departme nt to
.
use its hu e l gal resources to ente
r, on the side of black people and other
? �
.
_
racial
n:u no�ttes, every pend ing case raising the i ssue of the
_
constttut1onahty of racial pref
eren ce s .

193 Wygant v . Ja ks n
d. of Educ., 476 U . S . 267 ,
� �
29 1 ( 1 986) (O'Connoe J . , concurring in
part and eoncumng m J udgmen
t).

�

Indeed, our recognitio
� of the respon sib le state actor ' s competency to take
.
these steps i s ass umed m
our rec ogn itio n
of the States' constitutional duty
to take aftfirma ive step
s
to
el'
un
mat
e
.
th e contmumg effe cts of past
. .
. nal .
unconstttutio
discnmmation .
·

·

Id.
194

·

tzn ick 44 8 u s 448
48 2 ( 1 98?) , overruled
by Adara nd Constructo rs v.
Pena, 5 1 5 U.S . 200 ( 1 995
) (Marshall J
Fulllove v. K.lu

·

·

'

. , con c mn g)). ("[W
]e reje ct the contention that in
the remedial conte t the
�
Co ngress must
act 10 a wholly ' col
Swann v. Charlotte-M
or-b lind ' fashion" (quoting
eckle bu
g Boa d of Education 402 U.S
( 197 1 )). See also, Wyg
. 1 , 1 8-2 1 , 9 1 S . Ct. R67
ant' 4 6 S at S0-8
1 . We have recognize
.
to remedy the effec ts
d, however, that in order
_
of pn 0r d1scn
.
mmati on ' i t may
.
A s part ofth is Natio
be necessary to take race mto
.
.
accou nt.
n ' s ded'1cat1on to
.
.
era
dic
ati
ng
racia 1 discnm. mation,
be called upon to
inno cent pers on s may
bear some of the
b urden o f the
remedy .

�

; �

;

·

·

.
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A. Congressional Remedial Authority
A threshold question that must be re sol ved prior to the implementation of
any Congressionally mandated race-based remed i al affirmative action programs is
whether the Constitution authorizes Congr e s s to engage in efforts to ameliorate
discriminatory practices in the private as well as the public sector of higher
education. Although j udicial inquiry into the e xtent of Congre ss' remedial powers
is not novel , the issue remains unresolved b y t h e Court. Questions regarding the
extent of Congressional remedial powers were rai sed almost twenty years ago in
Fullilove. In Fullilove the Court addressed t h e extent of Congressional authority
to impose remedial measures designed to el imin ate racial discrimination i n federal
contracting and procurement programs . 1 95 I n t h e pl urality opinion, Justice Burger
concluded that

[i]t is fundamental that in no organ o f government, state or federal ,
does there repose a more comprehe n s i ve remedial power than in
Congress, expressly charged by the C on stitution with competence
and authority to enforce equal protection guarantees. Congress not
only may induce voluntary action to assure compliance with
existing federal s tatutory or constitutional antidi scrimination
provisions, but also, where Congres s h a s authority to declare
certain conduct unlawful, it may, a s h ere, authorize and induce
state action to avoid such conduct. 1 96
Although the Adarand decision overturned Fullilove due to the Court ' s
failure i n Fullilove t o apply strict scrutiny t o e v al u ate the constitutionality o f the

minority set-aside program at issue in the case, the Court has never repudiated
Justice Burger' s interpretation of Congress' s r e medial authority in this area. 197 For

195

Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 45 9 . The stated obj ective of the minority set aside program at
issu e in Fullilove was "to direct funds into the minority b usiness conununity, a sector of the
economy sorely in need of economic stimulus but which, on the basis of past experience
with Government procurement programs, could not be expected to benefit significantly from
the public works program as then formulated." Id.
196

197

Id. at 483-84.
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 5 1 5 U.S. 200, 23 5 ( 1 99 5 ) .
Of course, it follows that to the extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal
racial classifications to be subj ect to a less rigorous standard, it i s no
longer controlling.

But we need not decide tody whether the program

upheld in Fullilove would survive strict scrutiny as our more recent cases

Id.

have defined it.
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example, Justice O ' Connor echoed this Constitutional philosophy in Croson.
noted that

She

Congress, u nlike any State or p o litical subdivision, has a specific
constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The power to 'enforce ' may at times also include the
power to define situations which Congress determines threaten
principles of equality and to adopt prophy lactic rules to deal with
those situations. 1 98
The origin o f the C ongressi o n al authority referred to by Justices Burger and
O' Connor is found i n §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment which gives Congress the
power to enforce its provi s i on s "by appropriate legislation . " 1 99 J ustice Powell, in
discussing the legislative history of the post-Civil War Amendments, noted
specifical l y that "the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may have conte mplated
that Congress, rather than the federal c ourts, would be the prime force behind
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment." To date, the Court has not articulated
the scope of this power,200 but it i s clear that such Congressional power is
reviewable by the j udiciary, and as such must conform to the mandates of the
Court' s interpretation of the equal protection paradi g m . 20 1 N otw ithstandi ng
lingering questio n s about the scope of Congressional remedial power, one fact is
clear. Any governmental use of racial c l a s s ifications, whether util i zed by city, state,
federal, or Congressional authority, must c omply with the strict scrutiny analysi s .
198

199

City of Richmon d v. J.A. Croson Co., 4 8 8 U . S . 469 ' 478 ( 1 989).
See Katzenbach v . Morgan, 384 U.S. 64 1 , 6 5 1 ( 1 966).

�

Th�s t e

Id.

. . standard is the measure o f

con sti tu te s appropri ate
�egi slati.o� under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Correctly viewed, §5
�s a �osi ti �e grant of legislative power authorizing Congre ss to exercise
its discretion i n determining whether and what legislation is n eeded to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment .
·,

wh at

'

200 Adarand, 5 1 5 U . S . at 230.

It is true �a t various Members of this Court h ave taken
di fferent views of
the aut�onty S 5 o f the Fourteenth Ame ndment confe
rs upon Congress to
deal with the problem of racial discrimination
and the exten t to which
co�rts shou ld defer lo Congress' exer cise
of that authority [citation
omitt�dl We need not, and do not, address
these differenc es t day . For
.
w, it i s eno ugh to observe that J
us tice Stevens' sugg es tion that any
_
ember of this
.
Court has repu d·tate d m th'is case his
or her previously
.
expres sed view s on the subj ect pos
.
t at 2 1 23 2 1 25 , 2 1 27 , i. s incorrect.
,

�

�

·

Id.
20 1

•

-

.
.
See Justice Powell ' s concumng
opm1 on m Fullilove, 448 U.S . at
509.
·
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As the Court in Adarand held, the equal protection paradigm requires that "such
classifications are constitutional only if they are n arrowly tailored measures that
further compelling governmental interests ."202
Justice O'Connor's willingness to appl y strict scrutiny with equal force to
remedial legislation promul gated by state or

federal actors has been severely

criticized. In his dissenting opinion in Adarand, J u stice Stevens argues that such
application ignores the "practical and legal differences between federal and state or
local decisionmakers . "203

He argues that §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment

empowers the federal government to enact l e g i s lation aimed at eliminating "historic
racial subjugation. "204 As such, judicial deference must be expended to the exercise
of the federal decision-making authorized in furtherance of this mandate. He argued
that such deference is a necessary weapon in the fight

to eliminate racial

discrimination:
The Fourteenth Amendment directly empowers Congress at the
same time it expressly limits the S tate s . This is no accident.

It

represents our Nation's consensus, achieved after hard experience
throughout our sorry h istory of race relations, that the Federal
Government must be the primary defender of racial minorities
against the S tates, some of which may be inclined to oppres s such
minorities.

A rule of 'congruence' that ignores a purposeful

'incongruity ' so fundamental to our system of governmen t is
unacceptable.205
One proposition which served as the basis for Justice O'Connor's decision
in Adarand to apply strict scrutiny to evaluate the use of racial classifications by
federal actors focu sed on the need for congruence between the equal protection

202
203

da

rand, 5 1 5 U . S . at 227.
Id. at 249 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

A

An additional reason for giving greater deference to the National
Legislature than to a local law-making bady is that federal affirmative
action programs represent the will

o f our entire Nation's

elected

representatives, whereas a state or local program may have an impact on
nonresident entities who played no part in the decision to enact it. Thus,
in the state or local context, individuals who were unable to vote for the
local representatives

who enacted a race-conscious program may

nonetheless fel l the effects of that program.

Id. at 252.

204 Id. at 252.
205

Id. at 255.
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206 Justice Steve n s ,
ana l y s i s required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
the fundame ntal
howeve r, argued that Justice O'Conn or's rule o f congrue nce i gnores
of the fed eral
distincti on between the broad national decision- making authority
t of program s
govern ment, and the limited scope of state legislatures t o the detrimen

r
aimed at furthering the goal s of the Fourteenth Amendment.207 Justice O'Conno
y
b
furthered
are
equality
of
principles
the
cou n t e red this argument by noting that
app l y i n g t h e same exacting standard o f review, notwithsta nding the branch o f
.
ak. 208
" 1" on-m er.
gove rn ment serving as the dec1s

.., Sec J ustice O'Connor discu ss i on reg arding congruence in Adarand, 5 l 5 U . S . at 224.

z

1'" J u stice S te vens . dissent, Adarand, 5 1 5 U.S. at 25 3. Id. a t 253 ( Stevens, J., dissenti n g ) .
Prcsumahly, the majority is n o w salislied that i t s t h eory o f 'congruence'
hc t wcc n the suhstanti v c rights provided by the Fifth and Fourteenth
/\ mcnd mc nts disposes o r the objection based upon d i v i dcd constitutional

po wer s . But il is one thing to say (as no one seems to dispute) that the

h fth A mendment encompasses a general guarantee o f equal protection as
broad as that contained w i t h i n the Fourteenth A me ndment. It is another

thing ent irel y to say

that Con gress' institutional

competence and

constit utional author i t y entitles it to no greater deference when i i enacts
a program designed to foster equality than the deference due to a State
legislature.
�'"

lcl. at 210-1 1 (O Connor, J . ) .
'

J ustice Stevens also c l aims that we have ignored any di fference between
federal and slate legislatures. But requiring that Congress, like the S t ates ,

enact racial c l as si fi c at i o n s only when doing so is necessary to further a
'compel ling interest' doc s not contravene any p ri nciple o f appropriate
re spe c t ror a coe q ua l hranch of the Government.

It is true that various

Members or thi s Court have taken di fferent views o f the a uthority §5 of

the Founecnth Amendment confers upon Congress to deal with the
problem of racial dis c ri mination, and the ex.tent t o which courts should

defer lo Congress'

e xercise of that authorit y .

See, e.g., Metro

Broadcasting. Inc. v. FCC. 497 U.S. 547, 605-06 ( 1 975) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting): City o f R i c h mond v . J.A. Croson C o . , 488 U . S .469, 486-93
< O'Connor. J . . Rehnqu i st, C . J . , and While, J . ) (Kennedy, J . , concurring

in part and con c u rri n g in j udg men t) (Scalia. J ., co ncurring i n j udgment) ;

Full ilove �-. Klutznick . . 448 U .S . 448. 472-73 ( 1 980) ( B urger, C . J . )
! Powell. J . . concurri n g ) ( S tewart. J . . dissenting) .

We need not, and do

not. address these di ffere n c e s today. For now, it is enough to observe that
J u s ucc Stevens' suggestion that any Memher of thi s Court has repudiated

i n lhi � case h i s

or

her previous l y ex. pressed views on the subject, post, at

2 1 2 .\ . 2 1 25. 2 1 21. i s i ncorrect.
Id. at 2 .\ 0 - � I
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Notwithstand i n g this criticism, the Court h a s , however, acknowledged that
Congressional legi slati ve power is broader t h an that which may b e e xercised by
state and local governments .

Justice O ' C onnor recognized this d i stinction in

Croson, when she noted that "Congres s may i dentify and redre s s the effects of
society-wide discrimination does not mean t h at , a fortiori, the States and their

political subdivisions are free to decide that s u c h remedies are appropriate." 209 The

scope of Congressional p ower has clearly been d i stinguished from that held by other
political entities . In Bakke, the Court noted t h at the University ' s "broad mission is
education, not the fonnulation of any legi s l ative policy or the adj udication of
particular claims of i l l e gality." 2 10 This l ack o f national legi s l ative authority
prevented the University from implementing remedial affirmati ve act i o n measures
designed to address soci etal discrimination.21 1 Congress, on the other hand, is not
only authorized, but e x pected to fulfill the mand ated of the Fourteenth Amendment
by addressing discri mination on a national scope.

In Bakke, J u s tice Powell

concluded that "[b ]efore relying upon these s orts of findings in estab l i s hing a racial
classification, a governmental body must h a v e the authority and capability to
establish, in the record, that the classifi cation
discrimination. "212

i s responsive

t o identified

This position was also expressed b y J u s tice Powell i n his concurrence in

Fullilove. 1n drawing the distinction, he n o t e d that "[t]he hi story of this Court' s

review of congressional action demonstrates beyond question that the national
Legislature is competent to find constitutional and statutory violations."213 He thus
concluded that "it is beyond question, therefore , that Congress has the authority to
identify unlawful d i s criminatory practices, t o prohibit those practices, and to
pres cribe remedies to eradicate their continuing effects."214

B. Strict Scrutiny A nalysis:
1 . Compelling state intere st
It is axiomatic that the goal of remedying past discrimination or the present

209
210
21 1

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U . S . 469, 490 ( 1 989).
Regents of the U niv . of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U . S . 265, 309 ( 1 978).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309 ("Petitioner does not p urport to have made, and is in no position

to make, such findings.").

212

21 3

Id.

Fullilove, 448 U . S . at 4 9 8 ( Powell, J. concurring).
Fullil ove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 498 ( 1 9 80), ove rruled by Adarand Constructors v.
Pen a, 5 1 5 U.S. 200, 235 ( 1 995) (Powell, J. concurring). Id. at 502.

214

27 2
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effects of past d i scriminatory practices2 1 5 c a n serve as a basis for use of race-bas ed
lassifications.2i6

Prior to the development and i mp l e me n tat ion o f a race-based

�ffirmative action program, Congress must e stabli sh a "strong b a s i s in evidence for

its conclusion that remedial action was nece s s ary. "2 1 7 Thus it would require proo f

of the existence of prior discrimination or the present effects o f discrimination
within the field of higher education . 2 1 8

As J u stice Powe l l noted in Bakke, "[t]he

State certainly h as a legitimate and substantial intere st in

2 15 Definition of present effects of past discrimination:

ame l i orati ng, or

Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 1 53 (4th Cir. 1 994) ('To have a present effect of past
discrimination sufficient to justify the program, the party seeking lo implement the program
must, at a minimum, prove that the effect it pro ffers is caused by the past discrimination and
that the effect is of sufficient magnitude to j ustify the program.").
21 6 W
ygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 ( 1 986) (O' Connor, J. concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) ("The Court is in agreement that . . . remedying past or
present racial discrimination . . . is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the
remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmativ e action program. "); See also Id. at 274
(Powell, J. plurality) ("This Court has never held that societal discrimination alo ne is
sufficient tojustify a racial classification. Rather, the Court has insisted upon some showing
of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing li mited use of
racial classifications in order to remedy such d i s crimination."); Id. at 286 (O'Connor, J.
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("The Court is in agreement that, whatever
the formulation employed, remedying past or present racial discrimination by a state actor
is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed
affirmative action program."); Fullilove, 448 U . S . at 497 (Powell, J . concurring) ("The
Government does have a legitimate interest in ameliorating the disabling effects of identified
discrimination.").
2 17 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 ( 1 986).
218
Congress together with the Federal Communicat ions Commission, made a similar finding
of past discrimination in the field of mass communications. In Metro Broadcasting, the
�CC promulgated a program to encourage minority participation in communications
mdus�' Altho�gh the case primarily focu s e d on the attainmen t of diversity as a
.
const1tut10nal basis for the FCC's preferential incentive program, the FCC and Congress
also argued that there was a remedial basis for the program.
Congres � fo_u n� �at ' �he effects or past inequities stemming
from racial
a�d e1?�1c �isc nmmation have resulte d i n a severe underr
epres e ntati on of
mmonties m the media of mass comm unications.
' Citati ons omitted.
Co��ress �d the Comr:n ssion �o not j usti fy
the minority owne rship
pohc1es strictly as remedies for victims of this
discrimination, however.
Ra��r, C�ngr�ss and the FCC have selec
ted the minority owne rship
pohcies pn�az:ly to promote programm
ing diversity, and they urge that
.
such diversity is an important government
al objective that can serve as a
. .
constituh ona l basi s for the preferen
ce poli cies
Metro Broadcasting, Inc., v . FCC, 497 U.S.
547 , 566 ( j 990) .
·

·
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eliminating where feasi b l e , the disabling effects o f i dentified discrimination."2 19 He
further noted that the C ourt has "never approv e d a classification that aids persons
perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other
innocent individuals i n the absence of j u d i c i a l , legislati ve, or administrative
findings of constituti onal or statutory violat i o n s."220

There is an unresolved

question regarding the scope and speci fi c i ty required of such Congressional
findings.
Justice Powel l has, however, provided gui dance in this area. He stated that
the "degree of specifi c i ty required in the fi ndi ngs o f di scrimination and the breadth
of discretion in the choice of remedies may v ary w i th the nature and authority of a

governmental body."221

Congress as a nati o n al governing body has broader

investigative and remedial powers than munici pal or state governments. The Court

has approved this deferential approach to Congre ssional decision-making .222

For

example, strict scrutiny analysis rej ects the argument that societal di scrimination
can also serve as a c o mpelling justification for the use of race-based remedial
measures. Justice Powe l l in Wygant argued that the Court requires "some showing
of prior discrimination by the governmental u n i t involved before allowing l imited

2
19
220

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U . S . 265, 307 ( 1 9 7 8).

Id. "Before relying upon these sorts of findings i n establishing a racial classification, a
governmental body must have the authority and capability to establish, in the record, that the

classification is responsive to identified discriminati on . Id. at 309. See also Justice Powell,
plurality opinion in Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 ("In the absence of particularized findings, a
"

court could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their
ability to affect the future."). Justice O' Connor, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment in Wygant, 476 U . S . at 286 ("This remedial purpose need not be accompanied by
contemporaneous findings of actual discrimination to be accepted as legiti mate as long as

the public actor has a firm basis for believing that remedial action is required.").
221
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U . S . 448, 5 1 5 ( 1 980), (Powell, J., concurring) overruled by
Adarand Constructors v . Pena, 5 1 5 U.S. 200 ( 1 99 5 ) .
222

Id. at 472.

A program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial
context, calls for close examination; yet we are bound to approach our
task with appropriate deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch
charged by the Constitution with the power to "provide for the

. . .

general Welfare of the United States" and "to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, "

the

equal

protection

guarantees

of the

Fourteenth

Amendment. Art. I, §8, cl. I ; Arndt. 1 4, § 5 .
Metro Broadcasting, 497 U . S . at 563 ("We explained [in Fullilove] that deference was
appropriate in light of C ongress' institutional competence as the National Legislature . . . as
well as Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause . . , the Spending Clause, . . . , and
the Civil War Amendments.").
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use ofracial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination."223 In defining
"societal" discrimination, Justice O'Connor points out that it is "discrimination that
i s not traceable to [government agency ' s] own actions."m
To the extent that Congress, through the exercise of its legislative authority,
engaged in specific acts of discrimination, Congress may use race-based measures
to eliminate the effects of those acts. However, Congressional remedial authority
may also come into play if Congre s s was a "passive participant" in the
discriminatory c onduct of others, and acts to alleviate the cffects of that conduct as
well. The basis for the Court' s reasoning in this regard can be found in the exercise
of the government' s spending powers. The Court has previou sly established that
government entities may intervene to eliminate racially discriminatory structures
that receive public financing. In Croson, the Court held that "Ii ]t is beyond dispute
that any public entity, state or federal, has a compel ling interest in assuring that
public dollars, drawn from the tax contributions of all citizens, do not serve to
finance the evil o f private prejudice. "225
In expanding on the connection between the exercise o f spending powers
and Congressional remedial authority pre viously discussed in Croson, the Court in ·
Fullilove noted that

Congress was exercising its powers under §5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment in making a finding that past discrimination would
cause federal funds to be distributed i n a manner which reinforced
prior patterns of discrimination. While the States and their
subdivisions may take remedial action when they posses s e vidence
th �t their ?"".n s �ending practices are exacerbating a pattern of
.
pnor 1scnrm � at10n, they must identify that discrimination, public
or pnvate, with some specificity before they may u se race 
conscious relief.226

�

�h� Court has had several opportun itie s to apply the "pa s s i ve participant"

theory within the c ontext of determin ing the c o nstitutionality of race-based remedial
measures. In Croson
· could show that it had
. ' the Court n oted th at ""tf the city
.
essentially become a 'passive part·icipant m
· a system of racial exclusion practiced
·
by e1ements o f t h e 1ocal construct·ion m
· d u stry, we thmk
· clear that the city could
It
·

'

223

224
22s

2 26

Wygant, 476 U . S . at 274.
Id. at 288 (O' Connor J concurri
City of Richmond v.
Croson

iA'.

Id. at S04.

�� m. ��t and concurring in judgment).
·•

4

U . S . 469, 492 ( 1 989).
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take affirmative steps to dismantle such a sy stem. "227 Also, in Fullilove, Congress
approved a $4 billion state and 1oca1 public works bi1l that included a 1 0% minority

set-aside provision.228 One of the primary obj ectives of the set-aside provision was

to eliminate barriers to and encourage minority p articipation in the government
contracting and procurement prograrn.229

Although there was no direct evidence

that Congressional legi s l ation was the source of such barriers, the Court deferred

to Congress's authority to remedy what it percei ved as a violation of the equal
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amen d ment.23° For exampl e , the Civil

Rights Commission found several barriers to the entry of minority contractors in the

government procurement program.
Among the maj or difficulties confrontin g minority businesses were
deficiencies

in

working capital,

i nability to meet

bonding

requirements, disabilities caused by an i nadequate 'track record,'
lack of awareness of bidding opportunities, unfamiliarity with
bidding procedures, preselection before the formal advertising
process, and the exercise of discretion by government procurement
officers to di s favor minority busines s e s .23 1
These findings and others presented by other governmental agencies, i n cluding the
General Accounting Office, indicated that minorities were excluded from the
government procurement program as a result of soci etal discrimination, and not the

227

Id. at 492.
Fullilove v. Klutnick, 448 U.S. 448, 453 ( 1980), overruled by Adarand C onstructors v.
Pena, 5 1 5 U.S. 200 ( 1 995). One proponent of the bill stated that its purpose was to "direct
funds into the minority business community, a s ec tor of the economy sorely in need of
economic stimulus but which, on the basis of past experience with Government procurement
programs, could not b e expected to benefit significantly from the public works programs as
then fonnulated." Id. at 459.
229
Id. at 473. ("The clear objective of the MBE provision is disclosed by our necessarily
extended review of its legislative and administrative background. The program was
designed to ensure that, to the extent federal funds were granted under the Public Works
Employment Act of 1 977, grantees who elect to participate would not employ procurement
practices that Congres s has decided might result in perpetuation of the effects of prior
discrimination which had impaired or foreclosed access by minority businesses to public
228

contracting opportunitie s.").
Id. at 472. ("A program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial context,
calls for close examination; yet we are bound to approach our task with appropriate
deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with the power to
'provide for the . . . general welfare of the United States' and 'to enforce, b y appropriate
legislation,' the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.")
230

231

Id. at 467.
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exercise of direct Congressional authority .

Although the C o u

� v i � wed Congress

as a passive participant in this process, i t c o n c luded that thi s leg1 s lat1on was a valid
exercise of Congres sional Spending Powers .232
of the
�
In this case,

Congress' s role as a passive part i c ipant in the rac ial segregatio
broadcasting industry was also apparent in Metro

Broadcasll� K ·

Congress and the FCC attempted to i mp l eme n t race-based ince n t i v e programs, the
goal of which was to increase min ority part i c ipat i on in the broadcasti ng i ndust ry . 211

_

The government' s principle argument in s upport of the const1 t u 1 on ah ty of the

;�

�

remedial programs was related to its desi re to foster di versity w 1 t h 1

� t h e mdust:y. 1

However, Congre s s and the FCC also noted that they were ac t i n g to eliminate
barriers to minority entry in the field that were cau sed by past d i s c ri mination.21)
Although there were no allegations that g overnment legi s l ation or conduct we re

232

Fullilove, 448 U . S . at 473-475.
Although the Act reci tes no preamb ul ary " fi nd i ng s " on the subj ect, we arc
satisfied that Congress had abundant h i s torical basis from which it could
conclude that traditional procuremen t practices, when applied to minority
businesses,
Accordingly,

could

perpetuate

the

Congre s s reasonably

e ffec ts

o f prior

discrimination.

dete rmi n ed that the prospective

elimination of these barriers to minority firm access to public c omrac ti ng
opportunities generated by the 1 977 Act was appropri ate to e n sure that
those businesses were not denied equal opportunity to parti c i pate in
federal grants to state and local governments, which is one aspect o f the
equal protection of the laws. Insofar as the MBE program pertains to the
actions of state and local grantees, C on g re s s could have achieved its
objectives by use of its power under S5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

We concl ude that in this respect the obj ectives of the MBE pro vi s i on arc
within the scope of the Spending Power.

Id. al 478.
The minority incentive program at issue in Metro Broadcasting had two pri mary
components. "First, the Commission pl edged t o consider minority ownership as on e factor
in comparative proceedings for new licenses . " M e tro B roadcas ting, 497 U . S . 547, 556
( 1 990). The FCC also "outlined a plan to i ncrease minority opportuniti e s to receive

233

reassigned and transferred lic e n ses through the s o-called 'distress sale'
polic y ." Id. at 557.
234
at
("Congr� ss and the Commis s i o n do not j ustify the minority
ownership
.
pohe1es stnetly as remedie s for victims of this d i s crimin ati on
, howeve r. R a th e r, Congre ss
and the FCC have selected the minority ow nersh i p policies
primari l y to promote
_
_
pr�gr�mg
mm d1versi
ty, and they urge that such diversity is an
importan t governmen tal
obJecll ve that can serve as a constitutional bas i s for
the preference p ol i c i e s . " )
o�gre�s found that " th � effects of past i nequi
ties stemming from racial and ethnic
discnnunation have resulted m a severe under
repre sentat·on
1
o f mmont1es m th c med.1a o f
.
.
mass commumcat1ons . "
at 566.

I�.

�66.

23� �

·

Id.

·

·

·
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directly responsible for the past discrimination,236 the Court acknowledged the
remedial authority utilized by Congress in t h i s regard pursuant to constitutional
mandates.237
When engaging in the legi s l ative fact-finding process to determine the
existence of past discrimination or the present effects of any di scriminatory
practices, the Congressional inquiry must be broader than that undertaken by other

236

Id. at 553-54.
Although for the past two decades minorities have constituted at least
one-fifth of the United States population, during this time relati vely few
members o f minority groups have held broadcast licenses.

In 1 97 1 ,

minorities owned only I 0 of the approximately 7,500 radio stations in the

country and none of the more than 1 ,000 televis ion stati ons, . . . in 1 978,

minorities owned less than 1 percent of the Nation's radio and television
stations, see FCC Minority Ownership Task Force, Report on Minority
Ownership in Broadcasting I ( 1 978) (hereinafter Task Force Report); and

in 1 986, they owned j ust 2 . 1 percent o f the more than 1 1 ,000 radio and
television stations in the United State s .

See National Association of

Broadcasters, Minority Broadcasting Facts 6 (Sept. 1 986).

Moreover,

these statistics fail to reflect the fact that, as late entrants who o ften have
been able to obtain only the less valuable stations, many minority
broadcasters serve geographically limited markets with relati vely small
audiences.

Id. at 554.
237

Metro Broadcasting, 497 U . S . at 563.
It is of overriding signi ficance in the s e cases that the FCC's minority
ownership

programs

mandated--by Congress.

have

been

specifically

approved--indeed,

In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448' U . S . 448, J OO

S.Ct. 275 8 , 65 L.Ed.2d 902 ( 1 980), Chief Justice Burger, writing for

himself and two other Justices, observed that although " [a] program that

employs racial or ethnic criteria . . . calls for close examination , " when a
program employing a benign racial c l assification is adopted by an

admini strative agency at the explicit direction of Congress, we are " bound
to approach our task with appropriate deference to the Congress, a
co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with the power to 'provide
for the . . . general Welfare of the U nited S tates' and 'to enforce, by
appropriate legislation,' the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment . " (Citations omitted)

We explained that deference was

appropriate in light of Congress' institutional competence as the National
Legi slature, . . . as well as Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause,
. . . ;the Spending Clause, . . . , and the Civil War Amendments.

Id. at 563 .
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�

r� n:iedial ction is
types of political entities .238 In order to determi n e if race-bas
.
warranted, Justice Powell in Bakke noted that there must be J Ud1c ial, leg1slat1ve,
or administrative findings of constitutio n al or s tatu tory violations. "239 Within the

context of government action, the scope of these findings is dependent on the
branch of the political entity engaged i n the inquiry.

Congres s , as t he national

legislative body, is not bound by the same restric tions that limit municipalities and
states to investigate only l ocalized i nstan c e s of d iscrimination . 240 On the contrary,

§5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Court, has g i ven Congress the

latitude to investig ate and determine whether d i scri minat i on e x i s ts on a national
level.

In discussing this issue, Justice Powe l l argued that " ( t ] hc degree of

specificity required i n the findings of di scrimi nation and the breath o f di s c retion in

the choice of remedies may vary with the nature and authority of t h e governmental

23 8

Appendix-The Compelling Interest for A ffirmati ve Action in Fe de ral Procurement: A

Preliminary Survey, Department of Justice, Proposed Re form s to A ffirmative Ac ti on in

Federal Procurement, Fed. Reg., Vol. 6 1 , No. 1 0 1 ( 1 996) ( Fu rth e rmo re i n combatti ng (sic)
"

,

discrimination and its effects, Congress has the latitude to develop national remedies for

national problems . Congress need not make findings of di scrimination with the s ame degree
of precision as do state or local governments .

Nor i s it obligated to make findin gs of

discrimination in every industry or region that may be affected by a remedial measure.").

239

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 43 8 U . S . 265, 307 ( 1 998). Wygant v. Jackson Bd.

of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 206 ( 1 986), (O' Connor, J., concurring) ("This remedial purpose

need not be accompanied b y contemporaneous findings of actual discrimination to be
accepted as legitimate as long as the public actor has a firm basis for believing that remedial
action is required. ").

2 40

Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S . at 565 (Brennan, J.)

In fact, much of the language and reasoning in Croson reaffirmed the
lesson of Fullilove that race-conscious classifications adopted by
Congress to address racial and ethnic discrimination are subj ect to a
different standard than such classification s prescribed by state and local
governments .

For example, Justice O' Connor, joined by two other
Members o f this Court, noted that Congress may identify and redress the
effe�ts of soc iety-wide discrimination, " and that Congress "need not make
_
specific findings
of discrimination to engage in race- consciou s relief. "
Echoing Fullilov� 's emphasis on Congre ss as a National Legislat
ure that
stands above factional politics, Justice Scalia argued that as
a matter of
"so�ial reality and governmental theory, " the Federal
Government is
�nhkely to be c�pt�re? b� minority racial or ethnic groups
and used as an
mstrun_ien� o f ?1scnrrunat10n. Justice S c alia
explained that " [t]he s truggle
for :actal JUStlc � has historically been a strugg
le by the national society
.
agams t oppre ss10� m the indiv��ual S tates,
" because of the "heig htened
da�ger of oppre ssion from poht1cal factio
ns in small, rather than l arge '
.
pohtical units . "
Id. at 565 -66. (Citati ons ommitted).
"
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body."241
The distinction between the scope of Congressional fact-finding, and fact
finding undertaken by municipalities or states was set forth by Justi c e O'Connor in

Croson. She noted that
Congress has made national findings that there has been s ocietal
discrimination in a host of fields. If all a state or local government
need do i s find a congressional report on the subject to enact a set
aside program, the constraints of the Equal Protection cause will,
in effect, have been rendered a nullity.242
This distinction was apparent in the Court' s analysis of the race-based remedial
programs at issue i n Metro Broadcasting, Croson, Fullilove, Wygant, and Ada rand.

In these cases, challenges were made to race-based remedial programs established
by a governmental entity. Note that in Wygant and Croson the Court rejected the
factual predicate of past discrimination relied upon by the respecti ve municipalities
to justify their race-based remedial programs.243

241

The Court i n each instance

448 U.S. 5 15 , n. 1 4 ( 1 980), overruled by Adarand Constructors v.
5 1 5 U.S. 200, ( 1 995) (Powell, J., concurring).
City of Richmond v . J . A . Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1 989); Justice Powell, in

Fulllove v. Klutznick,

Pena,

242

Fullilove discussed the breath of Congres s ' s fact finding authority. He noted that:
The creation of national rules for the governance of our society simply
does not entail the same concept of recordmaking that is appropriate to a
judicial or administrative proceeding. Congress has no responsibility to
confine its vision to the facts and evidence adduced by particular p arties.
Instead, its special attribute as a legislative body lies in its broader mission
to investigate and consider all facts and opinions that may be relevant to
the resolution of an issue. One appropriate source is the information and
expertise that Congress acquires in the consideration and enactment of
earlier legislation. After Congress has legi slated repeatedly in an area of
national concern, its Members gain experience that may reduce the need
for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congress again considers
action in that area.

Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 502-03 .

243

J.A. Croson Co. , 488 U.S. at 498.
We think it clear that the factual predicate offered in support o f the
Richmond Plan suffers from the same two defects identified as fatal in

Wygant. The District Court found the city council's "findings sufficient
to ensure that, in adopting the Plan, it was remedying the present effects
of past discrimination in the construction i ndustry. " Like the "role model "
theory employed in Wygant, a generalized assertion that there has been
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determined

that

the

municipalities

relied

upon

generalized

findings

of

discrimination that were indicative of broader societal discrimination, and not the
particularized finds of discrimination required to overcome the constitutional
invalidity of racial c l assifications.244 Although other equal protection challenges
were raised, the Congressionally mandated findings of past discrimination were all
upheld in the remaining cases due to the Court ' s recognition of Congress' s autho rity
to engage in national fact-finding.
A Congressional inquiry into the exi s tence of discrimination or the present
effects of past d i scrimination within
unprecedented.245

the

educational

arena would not be

Congress, the Department of Justice, the Small Business

Administration, and additional governmental agencies engaged in a coordinated
effort to examine the government procurement and contracting program following
Adarand.246 The purpose of this investig at i o n was to establish a factual predicate
for the continued implementation of race-based contract decision that would satisfy
the strict scrutiny analysis mandated by Adarand.

In developing a strategic plan for Congressional review of the existence of
discrimination or the present effects of p a s t d iscrimination within the educational
arena, several factors must be considered . As i ndicated in Section IV . B . 1 . above,

past discrimination in an entire industry provides no guidance for a

legislative body to determine the prec i se scope of the injury it seeks to
remedy.

It "has no logical stopping point. "

" Relief" for such an

ill-defined wrong could extend u nti l the percentage of public contracts
awarded to MBE's i n Richmond mirrored the percentage of minorities in
the population as a whole.

Id.
244 Id. at 49 1

(citing Associated General Contractors of Cal. v. City ofSan Francisco, 8 1 3
.
· ·
·
F.2d 922 929 (9'b Crr. 1 9 87)) ("Th e ctty i s not JUSt hkc th e federal government with regard
·

.

.

to the findings it must make to j ustify race-conscious remedial action )
In 1 964 President Lyndon B . John son 1mtiated a national dialogue on the soc10.
.
econo c cond1tmn of poor Amencans. Pinned as the "War on Poverty ' government
agcncies, economi c advisors, and Congress w orked together to identi fy pr bl ems such as
.
sub -standard housmg ' educaf IOn, heaI th c are, and unemployment that plagued this segment
•

·"

245

·

�

•

.

.

·

.

.

·

.

�

�

�

�

o
f th e p pu1 atm
.
· Aft r numerous Congres s ional h earings, and the submission o f reports
.
.
and s tu dIes on th IS subject' Congress passe d t h c Econorruc
Opportunity Act of 1 964 which
. hed a numb
"
.
.
establ IS
er of programs .des1. gnc d t.o ehmmat[c] poverty by giving al l Americans
.
opportunities for work for educ atlon and trammg
and for the chance to l i ve in decency and
.
dignI·ty "' Lo
.
.
u
t
se
L
an
ct
er
'
'
··
ed
War
on
p
overty,
2 1 (Facts on File Inc · 1 967)
246 s ·
ee, mqmry mto contracting industr A
y, ppendi x-The Comp el ling Interest for Affi rmative
Action in Federal procuremen t· A Prelim n
i ary S urvey, Department of Justice, Prop os ed
·.
Reforms to Affirm ative Actio n m
Fed eral Procu rement, 6 1 Fed. Reg . , 1 0 1 ( 1 996).
'

.

'

·
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there must

be a "strong basis in evidence"247 for concluding that race-based
the appropriate remedy. Further, such evidence cannot broadly
f
sweep across eve ry segment o American society searching for generalized findings
of disc rimi n ation again st racial and ethnic minority groups.248 On the contrary, to
establish that Congress has a compelling interest in remedying discrimination within
the educational community, the Congressional investigation must be limited in a
affirmative ac ti o n is

number of way s .
a.

Time frame

an appropriate time frame must be established for determining the
existence of discrimination within this context . Although the process of j udicial
f
dismantling o segregated educational institutions began with Brown, many judi c i al
f
f
and legislati ve hurdles, including the passage of Title VI o the Civil Rights Act o
foll
d
owe that h istoric decision. 249 Any attempts to determine when wholesale
I 964,
First,

247
248

J .A. Croson Co. , 488

U

. S . at 500.

f

See, inquiry into contracting industry Appendix-The Compelling Interest for Af irmati ve

Action in Fed eral Procurement: A Preliminary Survey, Department of Justice, Proposed

Reforms to Affirmati ve Action in Federal Procurement. 6 1 Fed.Reg. 1 0 1 , May 23, 1 996, at

26042, 2605 1 . ("In evaluating the evidentiary predicate for affirmative action in fed er al

procurement, it is highly s ignificant that the measures have been authorized by Congress,

which has the unique and express constitutional power to pass laws to ensure the fulfillment

of the guaran tees of racial equality in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. These

explicit constitutional c ommands vest Congress with the authority to remedy discrimination

by private actors as well as state and local governments. Congress may also exercise its
constitutionall y grounded spending and commerce powers to ensure that discrimination in

our nation is not inadvertently perpetuated through government procurement practices. In

exercising its remedial authority, Congress need not target only deliberate acts of
discrimination . I t may also strive to eliminate the effects of discrimination that continue to
impair opportunity for minorities, even i n the absence of ongoing, i ntentional acts of

discrimi nation. ");See also, Oversight Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and
Con stitu tional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One

Hundredth Congress, First Session on Sex and Race Differences on Standardized Tests,

April 23, 1 987, Serial No. 9 3 .
m see also, STEPHAN THERNSTROM AND ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN B LACK AND

WHITE I 05 ( 1 99 7 ) .

Brown I stated the principle; Brown I/ was a guide to implementation, and
it sent a signal o f extreme patience and considerable flexibility. To begin

with, the task of determining what desegregation remedy was appropriate

in each community and of setting a realistic timetable for implementing

that remedy was left to local federal district judges.

As a result,
individual black parents had to bring complaints on a case-by-case basis
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ledge that this � as .a
de j ure segregation ended must realistically. ackno �
tI e . Howe ver, d1scmm nat ry
process that occurred over a significant pe od of ":i
.
not serve as compe llmg
patterns and practices that are too remote m ume will
U n f�rt�n atel y.' there
justification for the use of race-based remedial .mea� ures.250.
penod. L1m1te gm a ce
i s no mag ic formula for determ ining an appropn ate time

�adual
?

�

a

�

C on gress m
may be found by examini ng the time periods uti l i ze d by

� �

s1m1lar

inquiries.251

b. Scope of Congressional inquiry
As discussed in Section IV .A. above, a Congressional i nquiry into the
sy ste mi c

p ol i cies

,

patterns,

and practices of educational

in stitution

s must

when local authorities were indi fferent to the law. In the course of the
prolonged struggle that followed, the NAACP had to assume the burden
of initiating desegregation suits in more than two thousand southern
school districts.
In addition, the Court ordered districts operatin g single-race
schools lo proceed toward dismantling their dual school systems 'with all
deliberate speed.'

' With

...

speed'

would

seem to have meant

ex peditiously, hut in fact the permission to proceed al a ' deliberate' pace
was the more important message.

In the Border states, where black

population concentrations were smaller and the caste system was not as
rigidly enforced, desegregation did proceed with some di spatch and little
conllii.:l. But in the eleven ex-Confederate states 'deliberate' meant not
slow hut stop. There, a ful l decade after Brown, a mere 1 . 2 percent of
hlack puhlic school students attended schools that had any while pupils

al al l. Desegregation, one observer remarked, was proceeding with 'the
pai.:e of an ex traordinary arthritic snail.'

Id.
1"' Id. Middleton v . City of Flint. 92 F.3d 396, 409 (6'h Cir. 1 996). ("Furthermore, as thi s

court has noted previously, evidence of past discri mination that is remote in time w i l l not
support a claimof i.:ompclling governmental interest when other evidence is adduced to s h o w

that t h e governmental hod y has taken serious steps i n subsequent years Lo reverse the e ffects
o f past discrimination and to implement appropriate new standards. Thus in Brunet v. City

of Columh11s. I F.3d 390 (6'h Cir . 1 99 3 ) . we held that strong evidence proffered in J 9 8 9 that

a city fire department had discri minated prior to 1 975 "is too remote to support a compel l i n g
governme ntal in tere s t to justify the affirmative action plan , "especially in light of
eviden ce

that t he city had suhsequent ly taken steps to improve its recruitmen t efforts. ")
: • : S('('. i n q u iry i nto co ntrac t ing industry in which they examine d Congress
ional findings for
a twe n t y - s i x period from 1 980 through 1 996. Appendix -The Compelli ng Interes for
t
A ffinnati ve Action in Federal Procurem ent: A Preliminary Survey, Departme
nt of J ustice ,
Proposed Rcfonns to A ffirmativ e Action in Federal Procurement, 6 1 Fed.
Reg. No. 1 0 1
( 1 99 tl )
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specifically identify evidence of discrimination or the present effects of past racial
discrimination. As Justice O' Connor determined in Croson:
Proper findings in this regard are necessary to define both the

scope of the injury and the extent of the remedy necessary to c ure
its effects. Such findings also serve to a ssure all citizens that the
deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic
groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the
goal of equality itself. Absent such findings, there is a danger that
a racial

classification

is merely

the

product of unthinking

stereotypes or a forrn of racial poli ti c s .

' [I]f there is no duty to

attempt either to measure the recovery by the wrong or to distribute
that recovery within the inj ured class in an evenhanded way, our

history will adequately support a l egi s l ative preference for almost
any ethnic, religious, or racial group with the political strength to
negotiate 'a piece of the action' for i ts members. ' 252
Pursuant to the provisions of Title V I, educational institutions, both public

and private, that receive federal funds are prohibited from engaging in racially
discriminatory conduct.253

The focus of the inquiry will include not only

Congressional actions, but on the actions of institutions of higher education
governed by the provisions of Title VI because of their receipt of federal funds.
The data assembled for this inquiry may focus on a number of disputed areas that
fall within the scope of Title VI. There must, however, be a recognitio n that there
are two somewhat distinct areas within the educational field - students and faculty.

One area of inquiry may focu s on the existence of discrimination relating to faculty
hiring, retention, and promotion.254 Also i n c luded in the Congressional inquiry

252

J.A. Croson Co. , 488 U . S . , at 5 1 0- l l .
T
itle VI of the Ci vil Rights Act of 1 964 provides that " [n]o person in the United States
253
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from parti c i pation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal
financial assistance ." 42 U.S.C §2000d.
254 See gene rally, Edgar G. Epps , Affirmative A ction and Minority Access to Faculty

Positions, 59 OHIO STATE L. J. 755 ( 1 998); Deborah Jones Merritt and Barbara F. Reskin,
Sex, Race, and Credential s: The Truth about Affirmative Action in the Law Faculty Hiring,
97 COLUM.L.REv. 1 99 ( 1 997); Caroline Sootello Viernes Turner and Samuel L. Myers, Jr.,
Faculty Dive rsity and Affirmative Action, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION'S TESTAMENT OF HOPE:
STRATEGIES FOR A NEW ERA IN HIGHER EDUCATION 1 3 1 (Mildred Garcia ed., 1 997) ;
Deborah J. Merritt and Barbara F. Reskin, The Double Minority: Empirical Evidence of a
Double Standard in Law School Hiring of Minority Women, 65 S . C AL L. REV. 29 ( 1 992).
.
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woul d be t h e equal ly importan t issues re l ated to s tu de n t admis s i o n s a n d rete nt ion . �55
As the following indicates, a n u mber of h i gh ly d i sputed areas c o u l d be i n c l uded
within the scope of student related i s s ue s :

•

2
C u ltural, racial or e t h n i c b i as on standardi zed tests 50 such as the
PSAT, SAT, ACT, LSAT, GRE, and MCAT2'\7
R e liance on t he accuracy o f n u merical pred i ctors such as grade
point averages and standardized test scores2'\H

See generally, Deborah Jones Merritt, Symposium: Twenrv Years A.ficr Bakke: The Ui11
and Social Science ofAffirmative Action in Hig h e r Education, 59 01 110 S T . L.J . I 055 ( 1 99 K ) :
.
Wh v a Nation wide Ban o n Race-Conscious Adm issions Will Sha rp/_, Curtail Black
255

En ;ol/ments as the Nation 's Highest-Ranked Medical Schools, 23 J O C R '.'\ A L OF B LACKS I\
H IG H E R EDUCATION 22 (Spring 1 999); William G . Bowen and Derck Bok, The Shap e of the

River: Long-term Consequences on Considering Race in College and Un i1·ersiry Admissions
(Princeton University Press 1 998); SUSAN WELCH AND JOHN GR uHL, A 1-1:1 R :vt ATIVE i\CTIO\

AND M INORITY ENROLLMENTS IN MEDICAL AND LAW SCHOOLS ( 1 99 8 ) ; LI:\ IM F. W IGI 1n1A\.

STANDARDIZED TESTING AND EQU A L ACCES S : A TuTORIAL, CHAPTER 4, I :\ C0\1PELI.l\G
INTEREST: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON RACtAL DYNAMICS ll'\ H IGHER EDl.:CATIO\.

Prepublication Draft Advance Copy, A Report of the AERA Panel on Racial Dynamics in
Col l eges and Universities (Mitchell Chang, Daria Wilt, James Jones, Kcnji Hakuta, eds.,

1 999)(0n file with the author); ELLIS COSE, COLOR-BLIND 1 36-37 ( 1 99 7 ) ; Th eodo re Cross
and Robert Bruce Sl ater, Special Report: Why the End ofAffirmative Action Would Exclude
All But a Very Few B lacks form America 's Leading Universities and Graduate Schools, J .

O F B LACKS IN HIGHER
256

EDUC., September 30,

1 997' at 8 .

For discussions o f racial and cultural bias, s e e generally STEPHAN THERNSTR0\1 ASD

ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN B LAC K AND

WHITE 348-422 ( 1 9 9 7 ) ;

C H R ISTOP HER

J E NCKS AND MEREDITH PHILLIPS, THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP ( 1 99 8) ; CH ILLl:\G
ADMISSIONS: THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CRISIS AND THE SEARCH FOR A LTERNATIVES (Gary

Orfield and Edward Miller, eds., 1 998); Roberto Rodriguez, Test-Driven A dmissions: ETS
Responds to Criticism of SATs, Black Issues in Higher Education, September 5 , 1 996, at 7 ;
Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSA T: Narratives and Bias, 1 AM. U. J . GEN D E R & L. 1 2 1 ( 1 993) .
257

The Pre-Scholastic Aptitude Test(PSAT), S cholastic Aptitude Test( S AT),

Graduate

Record Examination(GRE), Medical College Admissions Test(MCAT) are admini s tered by
Educati onal Testing Services . The ACT Assessment is administered by American College
Testing, Law Services administers the Law School Admissions Test (LSA T ) .
2 8
5 See generally, Nicholas Lernann, Behind the SA T, Book Expert, Adapted fr
om " The Big
Test: The Secret History of the American Meritocracy, " September 6, 1 999 at 52; A
Measurement of What? Although 'Reliably Constant, ' Experts Say Standardized Test Scores

Are Often Misunderstood, B lack Issues in Higher Education, Septemb er 4, 1 997, at 1 8 ;
S usan Strum and Lani Guinier, The Future ofAffirmative Action: Reclaiming the Inno vative
Ideal, 84 CALIFORNtA L. REV. 953, 957 ( 1 996). ("Typical among the existing criteri
a and
selection methods are paper-and-pencil tests, such as the Scholastic Assess ment Test
(SAT),
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Access to public and private sources of financial a s s i s tance
Access to academic counse l or s and preparatory assi stance
Bias in the de velopment, admi n i stration, and impl e m entation of
admi ssions pol icies259
Under-representation of rac i al and ethnic minorities

m

certain

professional fields of study
For example, the controversy surrounding continued use of standardized
admissions tests has not escaped Congre ssional scrutiny.260 In May, 1 999, the
Office of Civil Rights ( "OCR") of the U . S . Department of Education distributed a

draft version of a guidebook entitled "Nondi scrimination in High-Stakes Testing:
A Re source Guide."261 Thi s guidebook pro v i d e s e ducational institutions w i th a
framework to i nsure that their use of standardized admi ssions tests c onform with the
an ti -di scrimi n ation

mandate s of Title VI of t h e Civil Rights Act of 1 964.

The

guidebook provides, in pertinent part, that "the use of any educati onal test which
has a sign ifi cant di sparate impact on members of any particu l ar race, national
origin, or sex is discriminatory ."262
This i n i tial draft guidebook required
educational institutions to j ustify their use of standardized admi s s i o n s tests as
" educationally necessary," and further provided that the instituti o n s e stablish that
no "practical alternative" for increasing the number of racial minorities and women
was available.263 The Department of Education received considerable criticism

the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT), and civil service exams. These te s ts , which are
used to predict future performance based on existing c apacity or ability, d o not correlate with
future performance for most applicants, at least not a s a method of ranking those 'most

qualified.' These tests and informal criteria making up our 'meritocracy' tell us more about

past opportunity than about future accomplishments on the job or in the classroom.").
259 seegenerally, SYLVIA HURTADO AND CHRISTINE NAVIA, RECONCILING COLLEGE ACCESS

AND THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE, !N AFFIRMATIVE ACTION'S TESTAMENT OF HOPE:

S TRATEGIES FOR A NEW ERA IN HIGHER EDUCATION 1 05 ( 1 997).
See Sex and Race Differences on Standardized Tests: Oversight Hearings before the
S ubcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights o f the Committee on the Judiciary, House
of Representatives , One Hundredth Congress, First Session on Sex and R ac e Differences
on Standardized Tests, April 23, 1 9 87, Serial No. 9 3 .
261
Amy Dockser Marcus, Standardized Test Guide Could Lead to Lawsuits, WALL STREET
J., May 5, 26, 1 999, at A2.

260

262
263

Id.

Id.
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from Congress, testing services, and educational i nstitutions re �arding th� proposed
guidelines. 264 In response to concerns rai se d during ongress � on�l he an s on the
matter, the Department of Education agre e d to modify the gm dehnes to confonn
11 5
to existing law. 2 6 Although this issue appears resolve at t e
ment, unresolved
��
questions remain about the exclusion of racial and ethmc mmonlles from access to

��

�

� �

aven ue s of higher education.

2. Narrow tail oring
As discussed in Section IV .B . 1 . above, Congress must initially find
evidence of either past discrimination or t h e present effects of past discrimination
Such a fi nding would support a findin g of a

in the field of higher education.

compelling state interest sufficient to j ustify the facial as we11 as applied use of
race-based remed i e s . Thereafter, the federal entity charged with developing a race
based remedial affirmative action program would be respons i b l e for insuring th at
the scope of the remedy be narrowly tai l o re d to specifically address the problems
identified by the Congressional finding s .266 S upreme C ourt precedent does offer

264 Patrick Healy, Education Dept. Official
tells Congress Guidelines on Testing Won't
Burden Colleges, Chron. Higher Educ., J u l y 2 , 1 999 at A30; J effrey Sclingo, Colleges urge
civil-rights office to revise g uidelines on testing, Chron. Higher
Edu c . , July 23,
A58.

1 999, at

265 In her testimony on June 22,
1 999, before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigation of the House Committee on Educa tion
and the Workforce, Norma V . Cantu',
Assistant Sec etary for Civil Rights, stated that
� _
[ w] e will make the language clear to
con onn to ex1stmg law . . . yes, the language
will change . " S tateme nt o f Norma v. Cantu',
Ass1s�nt Secretary for Civil Rights, Befo
r e the House Subcommittee on Oversight and
_
Investigations of the Hou se Committee
on Edu catio n and the Workfor ce, June 22, 1999.
After rece _ pt of comments rom inter
ested educ ators , testin g servi ces, and the public, the
_ �
OCR w1ll 1ssue a final version of the
guid
ebo ok in Fall , 1 999 .
266 R th
0 e Deve1 opment Corp. v.
US DO D, 49 F. Sup p. 2d 937
(W. D . Texas 1 999) .
The three pos t-Adarand cas
es tha t h av e addressed the
q uesti on of whether
th federal gov ernment's
�
SBA -ba s ed remedial pro
gram wa s narro wly
.
tailored to tts
purpose have unanim
ous ly agreed that it is not Each of
these courts hel d how
ever, th at the Gov
ernment had a compelling
urpose
actmg. The Court is
tro ubl ed by the imp lici s
t ugg estion in
ese op 1ru on s that wh
ile the federa1 govern
ment may be give n more
defere nc e than st a1e
.
' and 1 ocal go ve
rnmen t s m art1c
.
. uI atmg
.
a compellin
purpose for remed'ia
.
g
1 action It m us t no
. .
n
th
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e
I
ess
c
b
ng1d ly held to the
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standard s set for
th m Croso n
a cas . m
. voI vmg
.
the acti ons of a
muni cipal ity, i f it is
_
to show th t Its
acL
ion is narrow ly tail ore
.
purpo se . If Co n
d to that
gre ss is to be all
.
o wed a broad V1S1o
n o f the nation 's
problems, it see
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Paradise,267 the Court developed a set of

objectives that must be c onsidered when evaluating whether racial classifi cations
are narrowly tailored

enough to overcome the strict scrutiny of the equal protection

paradigm. In Paradise, J u stice Brennan articulated the following n arrow tailoring
standard:
In determining whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate,
we look to several factors, including the necessity for the rel i ef and
the efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duratio n of
the relief, incl uding the availability or waiver provision s ; the
relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market;
and the impact of the relief on the rights o f third partie s .268
The notion that strict scrutiny is "fatal in fact" is never more apparent than
when searching for a race-based remedial program
capable of withstanding the challenge that the program does not conform to the
narrow tailoring component of the equal protection paradigm. However, until such
time as Congressional findings indicate that present effects of past d i scrimination
continue to impact the field of higher educatio n , a thorough discussion of ways in
which a program might be narrowly tailored i s premature.
V . CONCLUSION
At this j uncture in the evolution of the Equal Protection Clause the Court
find s itsel f at an imp a s s e . Although the application of the strict scrutiny test fosters
a sense that the constitution is a racially neutral document, thi s i nterpretation
remains in opposition to the realities of the American social and political

deference in addressing those problems. In other words, there must be
some relationship between the breadth of the problem to be remedied and
the breadth of the remedy to be allowed. Strict application of the Croson
criteria, without consideration of Congress's role in addressing i ssues that
face the nation as a whole, will almost inevitably result in the invalidation
of congressional remedial measures. Such automatic invalidation would
render strict s crutiny "strict in theory; fatal in fact," a result that the
Supreme Court has explicitly rejected.
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 5 1 5 U .S. 200, 237 ( 1 995); See also, Sherbrooke Sodding Co.,
1 7 F. Supp.2d 1 026 (D . Minn. 1 998); Cortez III S ervice Corp. v. NASA, 950 F.Supp. 357
(D.D.C. 1996) ; Adarand Constructors v . Pena, 964 F.S upp. 1 556 ( 1 997),judg ment vacated
and remanded with directions to dismiss, 1 63 F.3d 1 292 (1 Olh Cir. 1 999).
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framework. Questions remain regarding whether there is a causal l ink between the

continuing effects of discrimination and the minimal number of racial and ethnic

minorities enroll e d in institutions of higher education. In addition, the ability of

pubic and private actors to implement race-based remedial measures remains a
constitutional mystery. While we wait for that "perfect" affirmative action test case

to work its way u p to the Supreme Court, the v iability of race -based affirmative
action programs i s questionable. Unfortun ate l y , we have run out of time and can

no longer wait for a j udicial solution w h e n equal ly viable avenues of relief are
available.

That this i s an issue of national i m portance is not subj ect to dispute. It is
the very nature of this national issue which c al l s for a remedial solution that is both

national in scope and mandated by the prov i s i ons of the constitution. Treating the

question of the viability of race-based affirrnati ve action programs as a political, not

solely judicial issue i s one important step toward finding an overarching, expedient

remedy that could exist within the constitutionally permissible parameters of the
strict scrutiny anal y s i s .

